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I. INTRODUCTION
The frenzy of political activity seen in 2005 triggered the resurgence of
a familiar topic in the national legislature - televised court proceedings.
Renewed interest may have come as a result of the recent Supreme Court
nominations and related hearings, or it may have been because the
opportunity seemed ripe for long-standing advocates to push the topic to the
forefront once again. Regardless of the reason, the evidence is undeniable:
the end of 2005 saw a flurry of bills introduced - three in the House' and
two in the Senate 2 - that would allow televised court proceedings in the
federal court system, and both Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice
Samuel Alito were asked about televised proceedings at least once during
their confirmation hearings.3 This interest has clearly held into 2006, as the
questioning of Justice Alito4 and the still-active bills demonstrate. 5
The changing composition of the Court and the continued debate have
provided a fertile ground for discussion and reflection on the role the
modem media plays in our system of justice. These events have provided a
springboard for the dialogue that follows. The goal of this article is to
provide a comprehensive overview of the current status of electronic media
in both state and federal (and trial and appellate) courtrooms, and to consider
the implications of various "access" programs around the nation. This
article also aims to provide a thorough discussion of the pros and cons of
broadcasted proceedings. 6  In doing so, this article will include the
precedential, pragmatic, and constitutional arguments promulgated by both
sides of the debate.7 Finally, this article will look to current views in the
1. H.R. 1751, 109th Cong. § 22 (2005); H.R. 2422, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4380, 109th
Cong. (2005).
2. S. 1768, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 829, 109th Cong. (2005).
3. Nomination of John G. Roberts Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005)
[hereinafter Roberts Hearings]; Nomination of Samuel A. Alito Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Alito Hearings].
4. See Alito Hearings, supra note 3.
5. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 303-27, 336-75 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part VI.
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Court,8 in the legislature, 9 and within the judicial conference'0 in predicting
the likelihood of change in courts' current practices.
II. INTRODUCING THE CONTENDERS
Proponents of broadcasted proceedings argue that opening the courts to
electronic media furthers many of the basic tenets of our government;
namely, accountability, openness, and fully informed public debate." These
arguments, and particularly those advanced by members of Congress,
contain veiled admonishments directed at the courts and at critics,
suggesting that it is time to end an era of aloofness, distance from the public,
and general inaccessibility.12  The arguments draw both from practical
considerations and constitutional text, making the suggestion that public
attendance (both in-person and through its surrogate, the media) serves dual
purposes: first, it provides an educational opportunity for those in the
audience, and second, it allows the public to fulfill its role as established in
the Constitution, operating as an independent oversight board and providing
accountability to the court system. 13
On the other side, critics of the recent legislative proposals (and those
concerned about the principle of broadcasted judicial proceedings in general)
readily and ably respond to the claims of proponents. Among the critics are
no lesser lights than the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice David
Souter, the Judicial Conference and the Criminal Defense Bar. 14  These
heavyweights have the other half of academia backing their position, and are
quick to refute the contention that all will be well with the world when
8. See infra notes 448-66 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 467-91 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 443-47 and accompanying text.
11. See generally 151 Cong. Rec. 121, S10426-S10430 (2005) (statements of Sen. Specter and
Sen. Leahy), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2005/sl768.html. Cameras in the
Courtroom: Hearing on S. 829 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005)
[hereinafter Statement of Feingold] (statement of Sen. Russ Feingold) ("[C]ourt proceedings are
public hearings, and the American people have the right to actively observe the operations of all
branches of our government.").
12. Press Release, Congressman Steve Chabot (Nov. 9, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Statement of Chabot] ("It is good public policy for Congress to facilitate through media access to the
courtroom. The ability of people to exercise their right to freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
and to petition the Government for redress of grievances.").
13. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE 118 (1998) ("The Framers
undeniably saw the jury as serving the public, both in its capacity to monitor and help administer
government, and in its educative role for the actual jurors.").
14. See Bruce Moyer, More Judgeships, Circuits, and Cameras?, 53 FED. LAW. 10 (2006) ("The
Judicial Conference and the criminal bar oppose the legislation, citing a number of concerns,
including the intimidation of jurors and witnesses.").
cameras are allowed into the federal courtrooms. The critics raise
substantial and valued concerns, among them the potential for intimidation
of jurors and witnesses, the possibility of a biased jury, grandstanding by the
judge and/or the participating attorneys, and lastly, the threat to general
courtroom decorum and the likelihood of chilled advocacy and judicial
questioning. "5
These arguments act as support or as criticism for present court
practices, which, as seen below, vary widely among the states and between
the state and federal court systems.' 6 However, before looking to these
venerated institutions, we travel to the Supreme Court to consider - and
appropriately so - precedent. 17 The current practice adopted by the Court is
introduced first, for this colors the policies of the lower courts.
III. PRESENT PRACTICES IN THE SUPREME COURT
While state and appellate courtroom practice varies widely, the High
Court - at least for the time being - sides with the critics.'8 The Court has
stuck fast to its position - in fact, many of the bulletins that the Court
publishes explicitly state that cameras are allowed nowhere inside the
building.' 9 This long-standing tradition is meant to preserve the decorum
and dignity of the courtroom and is not to be taken as an exclusionary
measure that aims to close the doors of the High Court completely.
20
Indeed, visitors are welcomed to the Court, both to view the building and to
hear oral arguments.2'
However, those who make the trek to the courtroom doors are not
necessarily guaranteed a seat. The Visitors Guide to Oral Argument at the
Supreme Court of the United States explicitly states:
All oral arguments are open to the public, but seating is limited and
on a first-come, first-seated basis .... Visitors should be aware that
cases may attract large crowds, with lines forming before the
building opens .... Court police officers will make every effort to
15. See infra notes 433-41 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
18. See generally infra notes 433-41 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Public Information Office of the Supreme Court of the United States, A Reporter's
Guide to Applications Pending Before The Supreme Court of the United States, 15, http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/reportersguide.pdf [hereinafter Reporter's Guide]; Visitor's
Guide to Oral Argument at the Supreme Court of the United States, 3 (reminding visitors that no
electronic devices are allowed in the courtroom at any time), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
visiting/visitorsguidetooralargument.pdf [hereinafter Visitor's Guide].
20. See Visitors Guide, supra note 19, at 2-3.
21. See generally Reporter's Guide, supra note 19.
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inform you as soon as possible whether you can expect to secure a
seat in the Courtroom. 2
In fact, the Court has such limited space that it allows two lines to form
before oral argument: one for spectators who wish to view the entire
proceedings, and one for those who only wish to see a three minute portion
of the proceedings.23 Space limitations often preclude citizens from viewing
particularly well-publicized and closely followed cases in full.2 4 Indeed, the
Courtroom certainly is no Super Bowl stadium: official publications of the
Court state that the dimensions of the room measure 82 by 91 feet.25  The
practical limitations become substantive limitations for potential viewers; it
should not come as much of a surprise that there are documented instances
of spectators "paying off" others waiting in line in order to guarantee access
to a seat, even for a mere three minutes.26
These limitations obviously create tensions between accommodating
visitors who are interested in viewing the "open" Court and keeping the
court orderly and operational.27 Such tensions are exacerbated by the fact
that the Court could become more open through the public's surrogate, the
media.28 The conflict between public access, both through direct public
attendance and through the media acting on behalf of the public, and the
expectations of judges and defendants in the administration of justice has
heightened as a growing percentage of the general public gets their
22. Visitors Guide, supra note 19, at 2.
23. See id.
24. There are approximately 300 seats available in the Supreme Court. The number of spectators
for major cases invariably outnumbers the seats inside the Court, and as a result the Supreme Court
developed the three-minute line. This, to many, is an incredibly unsatisfactory solution: spectators
are permitted to view court proceedings in three minute intervals and are then herded out for the next
rotation of eager citizens. See Joseph D. Whittaker, Crowd Waits All Night for Bakke arguments,
WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1977, at A8; Todd Piccus, Demystifying the Least Understood Branch:
Opening the Supreme Court to Broadcast Media, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1053, 1090 (1993) (noting that
"[e]ven with the three-minute rule, a total of 200 spectators were turned away from oral arguments
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke").
25. The Court Building 3 http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/courtbuilding.pdf [hereinafter
The Court Building].
26. Piccus, supra note 24, at 1091 (noting that Randall Terry, director of the anti-abortion group
Operation Rescue, was so bent on gaining admission to the oral argument of Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services that he bought the eleventh space in line for $ 100).
27. The reference to "open court" comes directly out of our Founding document. Article III
expressly states that, at least in the case of treason, the courts shall be open. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3,
cl. 1.
28. See generally MARJORIE COHN & DAVID Dow, CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM: TELEVISION
AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 41 (1998) ("In the event a courtroom cannot accommodate all
members of 'the public,' the media are often considered 'surrogates' for the public.").
information primarily through electronic media and television.2 9  The
conflict continues to play out in the decisions of the courts and through the
ongoing academic and (rightfully) public discussion. This interplay is first
discussed through the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court below.
IV. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MEDIA IN THE COURTS
The tension between the rights of the public to an open government and
the right of the criminal defendant to a fair trial has been present throughout
our Nation's history. z These rights clash particularly forcefully when the
media becomes involved, as the potential for prejudice is arguably more
likely with highly publicized criminal trials.3 Nonetheless, both the public
and the defendant are provided with basic rights under the Constitution, and
both sets of rights must be concurrently recognized and respected.32 Cases
arising within this last century have emphasized the discordance that can
result in trying to honor both sets of rights.33 The discussion that follows
describes the constitutional provisions employed by the judiciary and others,
some successfully and others not, in the attempt to make courtrooms fully
available to members of the public.
A. The Sixth Amendment
The Constitution, and in particular the Bill of Rights, confers many
benefits on both specific individuals and the general public. Some
provisions are aimed specifically at government or the accused, while others
29. See, e.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 562 (1981) ("Over the past 50 years, some
criminal cases characterized as 'sensational' have been subjected to extensive coverage by news
media, sometimes seriously interfering with the conduct of the proceedings and creating a setting
wholly inappropriate for the administration of justice.").
30. Nadine Strossen, Free Press and Fair Trial: Implications of the O.J. Simpson Case, 26 U.
TOL. L. REV. 647 (1995) ("As the O.J. Simpson trial has made dramatically clear, a defendant's fair
trial rights may be in tension with the First Amendment rights of the press and the public-the rights
to report and receive information about the trial.").
31. In fact, this tension is recognized by judges themselves. For example, the Honorable David
B. Sentelle has noted that:
All judges recognize the tension between this duty and the rights owed to the public in
general, and news media in particular, to disseminate information concerning such trials.
In the United States, this tension is enhanced by the primacy of the constitutional
protection of freedom of the press under our First Amendment.
Hon. David B. Sentelle, The Courts and the Media, 48 FED. LAW. 24, 25 (2001).
32. Television on Trial, ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 1998, at 23 ("There will always be some conflict
between the media and courts. But there can and must be an accommodation with television, as
there has been with newspapers.").
33. See generally Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Patton v. United States, 281
U.S. 276 (1930).
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simply announce broad, generalized principles to be followed by all.34 The
protections provided by each amendment and to whom those protections are
given are by no means crystal clear. Though the interpretation of the various
provisions may well be settled (at least for the time being), there are often a
fair number of dissenting voices, calling out for a different application or
interpretation of a particular provision.35 Such voices will be duly noted and
acknowledged in the discussion that follows.
The idea of constitutionally guaranteed public access is certainly not
distanced from the ambiguities that arise in trying to interpret and apply the
Constitution. In fact, the phrase "public trial" in the Sixth Amendment has
caused considerable dispute: does the Amendment provide rights to the
defendant alone, or also to the general public? 36 This ambiguity in the Sixth
Amendment first came before the Court in the case of Patton v. United
States, which raised the issue of whether a defendant had the right to waive a
trial by jury.37 In determining that a trial by jury was traditionally and
modernly "a valuable privilege bestowed upon the person accused" alone,
the Court dispensed of a potential public right, stating that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees were exclusive to the defendant.38 This decision
was reaffirmed some forty-nine years later in Gannett v. DePasquale, which
rejected the argument that the Sixth Amendment confers a right on the
general public that criminal trials be open and pronounced that:
Among the guarantees that the Amendment provides to a person
charged with the commission of a criminal offense, and to him
alone, is the "right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury." The Constitution nowhere mentions any right of access to a
criminal trial on the part of the public; its guarantee, like the others
enumerated, is personal to the accused.3 9
Though Patton40 and Gannett are still good law for their Sixth
Amendment holdings, considerable disagreement remains on the subject of
34. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law .... ); U.S. CONST. amend.
VI ("the accused shall enjoy ...."); U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
35. See infra notes 282-302 and accompanying text.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
37. Patton, 281 U.S. at 293 (noting that the crucial inquiry is whether "the effect of the
constitutional provisions in respect of trial by jury to establish a tribunal as part of the frame of
government, or only to guarantee to the accused the right to such a trial").
38. Id. at 296.
39. Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1979).
40. Patton was overruled by the Supreme Court on other grounds. See Williams v. Florida, 399
whether the Sixth Amendment right is specific to the accused. Consider, for
example, Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, in
which he unequivocally stated:
I, of course, continue to believe that Gannett was in error, both in its
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment generally, and in its
application to the suppression hearing, for I remain convinced that
the right to a public trial is to be found where the Constitution
explicitly placed it-in the Sixth Amendment.41
Disagreement with Patton and Gannett can also be heard on the
academic front: in suggesting that the Framers were aiming to both promote
the public good and protect the rights of the accused, scholars Akhil Reed
Amar and Alan Hirsch state:
The fundamental point is simply this: The jury trial is not just by the
people, but for them as well. If so, it is not for the defendant (or the
government) to waive. That perspective seems sound in theory. In
practice, the Supreme Court has held otherwise. In the 1930 case of
Patton v. United States, the Court held that the jury trial right
belongs to the defendant alone, to waive as he pleases. However,
the Court's opinion does not survive scrutiny . . . .The Court's
decision offers a classic illustration of the danger of viewing
individual constitutional clauses in isolation. Focusing on the Sixth
Amendment, the Court ignored the clear words of Article III: "The
Trial of all Crimes ... shall be by Jury." The debates at the state
conventions to ratify the Constitution establish beyond any doubt
42that these words were understood as words of obligation.
These two eminent scholars go on to argue that to read the Sixth
Amendment as done in Patton would have caused many of the influential
voices at the time of the Founding to "protest mightily., 43 Professors Amar
and Hirsch do not stand alone: members of the judiciary also recognize the
U.S. 78, 92 (1970) (overruling Patton in finding that juries of less than twelve are constitutional).
41. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 603 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
42. AMAR& HIRSCH, supra note 13, at 116-17 (1998).
43. Id. at 117. However, the Supreme Court has also stated that the Framers surely considered
this tension. The Honorable David Sentelle notes that the opinion in Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart explicitly recognized the tension between defendant's rights and the public's rights. See
Sentelle, supra note 31, at 25 (quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547 (1976),
which states: "The problems presented by this case are as old as the Republic. Neither in the
Constitution nor in contemporaneous writings do we find that the conflict between these two
important rights was anticipated, yet it is inconceivable that the authors of the Constitution were
unaware of the potential conflicts between the right to an unbiased jury and the guarantee of freedom
of the press").
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difficulties caused between the Supreme Court's jurisprudence and an
absolutist approach to the First Amendment, but are generally more cautious
in their advocacy, understanding that some of their biggest opponents on the
topic are also their colleagues. 44
Despite the historical evidence proffered by some and the ongoing
dissent of others on the bench, the fact remains: the Sixth Amendment
provides no rights to the general public, and thus precludes the possibility of
establishing a public right of access through this amendment.45 However, all
hope has not been lost for the proponents - enter the First Amendment.
B. The First Amendment
The first major challenge specifically dealing with media courtroom
access under the First Amendment came in the case of Estes v. Texas.4
Billie Sol Estes' trial was a showcase for everything and anything that could
go wrong in a televised trial. 47  Estes, on trial for swindling, became
44. See Sentelle, supra note 31, at 25 (explaining that while "[s]ome jurists, notably the late
Justices Hugo L. Black and William 0. Douglas, have advanced an absolutist view that the First
Amendment prohibits virtually any control of the media by the courts under any circumstances," the
fact remains that "historically, particularly in fairly recent years, that absolutist position has been in
tension with judicial views of the fair trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution").
45. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 603 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The court, however,
has eschewed the Sixth Amendment route."). Justice Blackmun continues by noting that other
constitutional sources backing the right of access pale in comparison:
The plurality turns to other possible constitutional sources and invokes a veritable
potpourri of them - the Speech Clause of the First Amendment, the Press Clause, the
Assembly Clause, the Ninth Amendment, and a cluster of penumbral guarantees
recognized in past decisions. This course is troublesome, but it is the route that has been
selected and, at least for now, we must live with it.
Id.
46. 381 U.S. 532 (1965). This was the first Supreme Court case involving the interplay between
public and press rights and courtroom decorum, but it wasn't the first judicial challenge. In fact,
certiorari was denied in a case involving a contempt order as a result of pre-trial radio broadcasts.
Justice Frankfurter dissented from the denial, stating that "[o]ne of the demands of a democratic
society is that the public should know what goes on in courts by being told by the press what
happens there." Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950).
47. The Court stated as much when it enumerated some of the dangers presented by cameras.
First, it noted that:
The potential impact of television on the jurors is perhaps of the greatest significance...
• If the community be hostile to an accused[,] a televised juror, realizing that he must
return to neighbors who saw the trial themselves, may wall be led "not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused ... 
Estes, 381 U.S. at 545. Second, the Court explained:
[W]hile it is practically impossible to assess the effect of television on jury attentiveness,
those of us who know juries realize the problem of jury 'distraction.' . . . Human nature
being what it is, not only will a juror's eyes be fixed on the camera, but also his mind will
infamous through the pretrial publicity - the clerk of the court had compiled
some eleven volumes of press clippings.48 When the time for the actual trial
came, the courtroom was filled beyond capacity. 49 Despite the notoriety of
the case, or perhaps because of it, the trial judge denied the defendant's
motion to prevent telecasting, and allowed the media in without
restrictions.50 Justice Clark described the scene of the courtroom as one of
chaos:
[A]t least 12 cameramen were engaged in the courtroom throughout
the hearing taking motion and still pictures and televising the
proceedings. Cables and wires were snaked across the courtroom
floor, three microphones were on the judge's bench and others were
beamed at the jury box and the counsel table. It is conceded that the
activities of the television crews and news photographers led to
considerable disruption of the hearings."
Justice Clark continued by explaining the damaging effect that the
pretrial publicity and unrestricted media access to pretrial proceedings had
on the defendant's trial, emphasizing that both witnesses and jurors were
made painfully aware of the public importance of the trial.52
After the pre-trial debacle, the trial judge imposed limitations on the
camera crews and news teams, but it appeared that the damage had been
done. 53  Technological difficulties caused additional problems, as only
portions of the trial were recorded, and newsroom editing resulted in a
be preoccupied with the telecasting rather than with the testimony.
Id. at 545. Thirdly, "new trials plainly would be jeopardized in that potential jurors will often have
seen and heard the original trial when it was telecast." Id. The Court also expressed concern about
the effects of broadcasting on witnesses, stating that "[s]ome [witnesses] may be demoralized and
frightened, some cocky and given to overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone speaking
publicly, and accuracy of statement may be severely undermined. Embarrassment may impede the
search for the truth, as may a natural tendency toward overdramatization." Id. at 547. Finally, the
Court noted that news media creates an additional responsibility for the trial judge, and, most
importantly, has an exacting effect on the defendant, stating that the media's "presence is a form of
mental - if not physical - harassment, resembling a police line-up or the third degree . . . . The
heightened public clamor resulting from radio and television coverage will inevitably result in
prejudice ... . Furthermore, telecasting may also deprive an accused of effective counsel." Id. at
549. In the end, the Court concluded that "[t]o the extent that television shapes [public] sentiment, it
can strip the accused of a fair trial." Id. at 550.
48. Id. at 535.
49. Id. ("All available seats in the courtroom were taken and some 30 persons stood in the
aisles.").
50. Id. at 535-36.
51. Id. at 536.
52. Id. at 536-37 (noting that the witnesses and jurors' faces were broadcasted on the evening
news).
53. Id. at 537 (explaining that when the trial started, the courtroom had been altered to contain
news media to a newly-constructed booth).
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skewed version of the trial being shown to the public. 54 The jury convicted
Estes, but he appealed on the grounds that the media frenzy and unrestrained
press violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.55
The trial court and Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Estes'
contention, but the United States Supreme Court reversed. 56
In analyzing Estes' constitutional claim, Justice Clark, writing for the
majority, began with a discussion of the Sixth Amendment, explaining that
the right to a "public trial" is one held by the accused, historically intended
to guarantee a fair adjudication. 57  The Court continued by stating that
though "[t]he free press has been a mighty catalyst in awaking public
interest in governmental affairs, . . . including court proceedings" that ability
"must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the
judicial process." '58 Indeed, the Court did not hesitate in using strong
language to suggest that cameras were simply not conducive with the
guarantee of a fair trial. 59  The holding reflects this view - the Court
ultimately determined that the media presence did in fact violate Estes' Due
Process rights, and reversed his conviction.6 °
The Court's disdain toward televised proceedings may have been, in
part, a result of the newness of camera use during trials. At the time of the
Estes trial, only two states allowed cameras and radio reporters in their
courtrooms, and only with restrictions. 61 The federal courts had a complete
prohibition on visual media.62 However, the Estes Court indicated that
"newness" was not the issue; rather, it was the "insidious influences" that
54. Id. at 537-38. As a result of continuing problems with telecasts, only the opening and
closing arguments of the state and the announcement of the jury verdict were televised live. Id. at
537.
55. Id. at 534-35.
56. Id. at 535.
57. Id. at 538-39.
58. Id. at 539.
59. Id. at 540 ("[This trial] is weighty evidence that our concepts of a fair trial do not tolerate
such an indulgence.").
60. Id. at 534-35.
61. Id. at 540. See also Gregory Curtis, TV on Trial, 23 TEXAS MONTHLY, July 1995, at 5;
RONALD L. GOLDFARB, TV OR NOT TV 24 (1998) (explaining that the sensational trials of the early
twentieth century caused the adoption of professional codes of responsibility across the nation).
Leading the forefront of reform was the 1937 Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which
prohibited photography while the court was in session and barred the broadcast of court proceedings.
Id. The ABA actively supported this Canon, issuing opinions denouncing courts that allowed such
practices to continue. Id. This standard was well entrenched at the time of the Estes decision, and
likely was a compelling factor in the Court's decision. Id.
62. Estes, 381 U.S. at 540.
cameras and other visual media had on "the administration of justice. 63
Such language indicated that the Court would be unwilling to change its
stance in the future, even if technology were to advance. Despite these
strong sentiments,64 time takes its toll on us all, and appears to have softened
the Court to a full change of heart a mere fifteen years later.65
This brings us to Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the seminal
case in declaring courtroom access a constitutional right.66 By this time, the
Court's composition had changed dramatically: Justice Clark, the author of
the majority opinion in Estes had since retired, as well as the four other
justices who constituted the majority faction in Estes: Chief Justice Warren,
Justice Douglas, Justice Harlan, and Justice Goldberg. 67 The retiring Court
members were replaced respectively by Justice Thurgood Marshall, Chief
Justice Warren Earl Burger, Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Lewis Powell,
and Justice Harry Blackmun. 6t This new, arguably more progressive Court
may have had a much more liberal view on the use of media in public
affairs, or may very well have been affected by the advances in technology
over the past fifteen years. At any rate, by the time Richmond Newspapers
made its way in front of the bench, the Court's position on courtroom
broadcasts was ripe for change.
63. Id. at 541 (citing Justice Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 33 ROCKY MT. L.
REV. 1 (1960)).
64. Indeed, the Estes opinion would suggest that cameras would never be an option. Consider
the following: "As has been said, the chief function of our judicial machinery is to ascertain the
truth. The use of television, however, cannot be said to contribute materially to this objective." Id.
at 544. Or consider the Court's closing statements:
It is said that the ever-advancing techniques of public communication and the adjustment
of the public to its presence may bring about a change in the effect of telecasting upon the
fairness of criminal trials. But we are not dealing here with future developments in the
field of electronics. Our judgment cannot be rested on the hypothesis of tomorrow but
must take the facts as they are presented today.
Id. at 551-52.
65. In fact, in Justice Stevens' concurrence he refers to Richmond Newspapers as a "watershed
case," noting that in the past the Court had never recognized a right to access certain information,
but that "[tioday, however, for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary
interference with access to important information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of
the press protected by the First Amendment." Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 582-83 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
66. Id. Though at least one other case had come up before Richmond Newspapers, it dealt
exclusively with the right of access at pretrial hearings and motions, as distinguished from the right
of access at the actual trial itself. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 370-71 (1979). As a
result, this was the first time the Court had dealt with an access issue since the Estes case (indeed,
the Chief Justice notes as much when he states that "the precise issue presented here has not
previously been before this Court for decision"). Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 563-64.
67. Justice Black left the bench in 1971, but given that he dissented in Estes, his departure was
not as instrumental in bringing a change on the Court with regards to this particular issue. Members
of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last
visited Sept. 26, 2006).
68. Id.
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Richmond Newspapers arose after a trial judge closed his courtroom to
the public for the fourth run of a murder trial. 69 After closing the courtroom,
the newspaper moved to intervene nunc pro tunc, and after the motion was
granted, the paper appealed the trial closure order.70 The Virginia appellate
and supreme court ruled against the newspaper, and the United States
Supreme Court granted review.7'
The very first paragraph of the majority's analysis made it apparent that
the Court had undergone a drastic change of view in the fifteen years since
Estes. Chief Justice Burger began the lead opinion with history, noting that
criminal trials in both the United States and England have been
presumptively open.72 As the Chief Justice explained, this presumption has
held for centuries for several reasons: first, open courts assure the public and
the defendant that the proceedings will be conducted fairly; second, there is
a "therapeutic value" in allowing the community to reconcile the emotions
that arise with particularly heinous crimes; and third, it reassures the public
that government systems are working effectively and correctly, and provides
a form of legal education to the public.73 After the historical overview and
accompanying support, the Chief Justice noted that the Bill of Rights,
including, of course, the First Amendment, was enacted against this
backdrop of traditional courtroom openness.74
Burger then turned to the text of the First Amendment, stating that "[i]n
guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First
Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so
69. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 559-60.
70. Id. at 562.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 565-67. Public attendance at trials was, for some time in English history, actually
compulsory. Id. at 565 (citing Daubney v. Cooper, 10 B. & C. 237, 240 (K.B. 1829)). Though this
requirement was later relaxed, the importance of public attendance never waned - emphasized by
Lord Coke and later memorialized in a opinion by the English Courts that stated that the presumptive
openness of the trial is an essential quality in a court of justice. Id. (citation omitted). Finding
extensive support in early American history, the Court noted that there is "nothing to suggest that the
presumptive openness of the trial .. .was not also an attribute of the judicial systems of colonial
America." Id. at 567 (citation omitted). Indeed, the idea that "[t]his legacy of open justice was
inherited by the English settlers in America" is commonplace throughout the Richmond Newspapers
decision. Id. at 590.
73. Id. at 569-72. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan noted that these factors make the case for
a "right of access" especially persuasive. He also stated that "the case for a right of access has
special force when drawn from an enduring and vital tradition of public entree to particular
proceedings or information. Such a tradition commands respect in part because the Constitution
carries the gloss of history." Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Brennan later
rephrases this right of access as "the right to report about the administration of justice." Id. at 592
(Brennan, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 575.
as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees., 75  Through this focus on
the First Amendment, the Chief Justice referenced precedential decisions
that suggested that, in interpreting the First Amendment, '"[i]t must be taken
as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the
context of a liberty-loving society, will allow."' ' 76  Under this framework,
the Amendment had been read to provide a "right to 'receive information
and ideas.' 77 The Chief Justice used this precedent in determining that:
Free speech carries with it some freedom to listen .... What this
means in the context of trials is that the First Amendment
guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government
from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open
to the public at the time the Amendment was adopted. 78
As is often the case, the language of the opinion foreshadowed the
inevitable conclusion: after the historical and precedent-based discussion,
the Court reversed the lower courts, holding that "[a]bsent an overriding
interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to
the public. '
79
Though Richmond Newspapers did not declare an explicit right of
access to media,8 ° it did declare that the public's right of access is a
75. Id. (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) ("[T]he First
Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit
government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw.")).
Burger later explained that the right of assembly also guaranteed in the First Amendment is
intertwined with the rights of speech and of the press, and is necessarily implicated in the newly
created "right of access" to courtrooms. Burger noted that:
People assemble in public places not only to speak or take action, but also to listen,
observe ... a trial courtroom also is a public place where the people generally-and
representatives of the media-have a right to be present, and where their presence
historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
Id. at 578.
76. Id. at 576 (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941)).
77. Id. (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)). See also Saxbe v. Washington Post
Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-63 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[P]ublic debate must not only be
unfettered; it must also be informed. For that reason this Court has repeatedly stated that First
Amendment concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas as well as the right of free
expression.").
78. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576. See also id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[T]he First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free expression and communicative
interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural role to play in securing and fostering our
republican system of self-government.").
79. Id. at 581.
80. One could plausibly apply this principle to argue that the statements made in Richmond
Newspapers are not limited to the public and printed press alone - the opinion suggests that there is
room for other rights in the First Amendment, and that may possibly include a right of access to
electronic media for both trial and appellate proceedings. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REc. S 10426 (daily
ed. Sept. 26, 2005) (statement of Sen. Specter) ("In a very fundamental sense, televising the
Supreme Court has been implicitly recognized - perhaps even sanctioned - in a 1980 decision by the
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guaranteed constitutional right, a major step in and of itself.8 In fact, an
expanded definition of the right appears to have been contemplated in a case
following closely on the heels of Richmond Newspapers, 12 which condoned,
if not advocated, the use of electronic media in the courtroom. The case was
Chandler v. Florida,83 which bore witness to the changing views of the
Court and the advances in the use of technology in courtrooms. The climate
in courtrooms across the nation was indeed changing, as the number of states
employing televisions in the courtrooms had increased from a mere two at
the time of the Estes decision 84 to sixteen at the time Florida adopted an
experimental program allowing media access.85 The number grew from
sixteen to thirty by the time of the Supreme Court decision in Chandler.
86
Despite this growth, the Florida program came under fire for televising a
dramatic burglary trial involving two police defendants.87 In a pretrial
motion, defendants sought to have the experimental program declared
Supreme Court of the United States entitled Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia. In this case, the
Supreme Court noted that a public trial belongs not only to the accused, but to the public and the
press as well; and that people now acquire information on court procedures chiefly through the print
and electronic media."). However, as mentioned in the discussion above regarding the Sixth
Amendment, such an extension of the "right of access" would not come without resistance. Indeed,
even the right as it stands now is not without its share of dissenters.
81. See generally Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 582-83 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Today,
however, for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference with access
to important information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by
the First Amendment."). But see id. at 605 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I do not believe that either
the First or the Sixth Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, requires that a
State's reasons for denying public access to a trial, where both the prosecuting attorney and the
defendant have consented to an order of closure approved by the judge, are subject to any additional
constitutional review at our hands.").
82. In fact, the close of the Richmond Newspapers opinion rejects the State's argument that
because a "right of access" is not enumerated in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights, it necessarily
does not exist. Id. at 579-80. In doing so, the Court referred to a basic premise behind the Bill of
Rights: though the Bill of Rights enumerated some basic guaranteed principles, it did not "preclude[]
recognition of important rights not enumerated." Id. at 579.
83. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
84. Estes v. Texas 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) ("[A]t this time those safeguards do not permit the
televising and photographing of a criminal trial, save in two states and there only under
restrictions.").
85. Chandler, 449 U.S. at 565. Six states had adopted rules regarding electronic coverage of
trials, while ten other states were "experimenting with such coverage." Id.
86. Id. at 560 n.6 ("As of October 1980, 19 States permitted coverage of trial and appellate
courts, 3 permitted coverage of trial courts only, 6 permitted appellate court coverage only," and "the
Maryland Court of Appeals authorized an 18-month experiment with broadcast coverage of both
trial and appellate court proceedings."). In fact, the Court notes this changing climate later in its
opinion, referring to "state experimentation with an evolving technology" and holding that, "in terms
... of mass communication, [this technology] was in its relative infancy in 1964, and is, even now,
in a state of continuing change." Id. at 574.
87. Id. at 567.
unconstitutional.88 The trial court denied the defendants' relief, and the state
supreme court refused to rule on the question, stating that it was not directly
relevant to the proceedings. 89  The trial ensued, televised over the
defendants' continued objections, and the jury eventually returned a guilty
verdict. 9° The verdict of the trial court was subsequently appealed but was
affirmed by the state appellate court and the state supreme court, and finally
by the United States Supreme Court. 9'
Throughout the appeals process, the Chandler defendants contended that
the holding in Estes created a per se ban on televised criminal trials, arguing
that televised proceedings were an inherent violation of a defendant's Due
Process rights.92 In rejecting the defendants' contention, the Court looked
closely at the six concurring opinions in Estes, and ultimately determined
that the Estes Court rendered a fact-based ruling rather than a per se ban. 93
The Court then declined to adopt a per se rule that televised proceedings
inherently violate a defendant's constitutional due process rights, noting that
"an absolute constitutional ban on broadcast coverage of trials cannot be
justified simply because there is a danger that, in some cases, prejudicial
broadcast accounts of pretrial and trial events may impair the ability of
jurors to decide the issue of guilt or innocence uninfluenced by extraneous
matter., 94  In condoning the use of cameras in the courtroom, the Court
essentially shifted the burden of proof from the media to the defendant,
stating that "the appropriate safeguard against such prejudice [caused by
publication] is the defendant's right to demonstrate that the media's
coverage of his case - be it printed or broadcast - compromised the ability
of the particular jury that heard the case to adjudicate fairly." 95
Of final note, and of particular importance to critics, is the Court's
express acknowledgment of the Florida Supreme Court's rejection of the
notion that there is a "state or federal constitutional right of access on the
part of photographers or the broadcast media to televise or electronically
record and thereafter disseminate court proceedings." 96 Because the Florida
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 567-68.
91. Id. at 568-69.
92. Id. at 570.
93. Id. at 570-71, 573 ("[A]t least as to a notorious criminal trial such as this one, the
considerations against allowing television in the courtroom so far outweigh the countervailing
factors advanced in its support as to require a holding that what was done in this case infringed
upon the fundamental right to fair trial assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." (citation omitted)).
94. Id. at 574-75.
95. Id. at 575.
96. Id. at 569 (noting that the Florida Supreme Court carefully framed its holding, it cited to the
opinion, which stated "[w]hile we have concluded that the due process clause does not prohibit
electronic media coverage of judicial proceedings per se, by the same token we reject the argument
of the [Post-Newsweek stations] that the first and sixth amendments to the United States
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Supreme Court based its experimental program on its right to supervise
administrative matters within state courts and not on any "constitutional
imperative," the High Court sidestepped the question of.whether such rights
could be implied. 97 However, the language of the opinion suggests that they
would not find such a right on this occasion, as they cite to the Florida
decision and their former ruling in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.
favorably. 9'
Even if the Court were to eventually extend the "right of access" from
Richmond Newspapers to include appellate proceedings and the electronic
media, 99 the right would by no means be absolute. Several of the Justices
noted such in their respective opinions in Richmond Newspapers. Justice
Stewart suggested that "[j]ust as a legislature may impose reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions upon the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms, so may a trial judge impose reasonable limitations upon the
unrestricted occupation of a courtroom by representatives of the press and
members of the public."100 This and other statements seem to reconcile the
damaging effects the media had in the Estes case with the newly pronounced
right of access in Richmond Newspapers. However, the "time, place, and
manner" rule can work both ways: at least one lower federal court has
upheld a per se ban on cameras in the courtroom, determining it to be a
Constitution mandate entry of the electronic media into judicial proceedings" (citation omitted)).
97. Id. at 570.
98. Id. at 569 ("The Florida court relied on our holding in Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc ... where we said: 'In the first place,... there is no constitutional right to have [live witness]
testimony recorded and broadcast. Second, while the guarantee of a public trial, in the words of Mr.
Justice Black, is 'a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of
persecution,' it confers no special benefit on the press. Nor does the Sixth Amendment require that
the trial-or any part of it-be broadcast live or on tape to the public. The requirement of a public trial
is satisfied by the opportunity of members of the public and the press to attend the trial and to report
what they have observed."' (citing Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978)).
99. At least as to the media, most courts feel that that extension of Richmond Newspapers to
encompass a right to broadcast proceedings would stretch that decision too far. See COHN & Dow,
supra note 28, at 43 (citing Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985) ("There is a long leap... between a public right under the
First Amendment ... to see a given trial televised. It is a leap that is not supported by history. It is a
leap we are not yet prepared to take.")). However, Cohn and Dow note that at least one federal trial
court has taken that leap, holding that "the press has a presumptive right to televise trials and the
public has the right to see them on television." Id. (citing Katzman v. Victoria's Secret, 923 F. Supp.
580, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
100. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 600 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring).
See also id. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[B]ecause 'the stretch of this protection is
theoretically endless,' it must be invoked with discrimination and temperance."); id. at 581 (citation
omitted) (noting that a court is presumably open "[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in the
findings...").
reasonable time, place and manner restriction rather than a violation of the
First Amendment. '01
Substantive considerations such as "time, place, and manner
restrictions" may play a role in limiting the "right of access" to the
courtrooms, but they are certainly not the only restrictions - current court
rules and the limited precedent are factors that limit the right as well.1
0 2
Indeed, these procedural limitations and practical considerations dictate that
the right of access is not absolute. This applies even in the Supreme Court,
where regulations allow the Marshal of the Supreme Court to declare at any
time that the Court building and grounds will be closed to the general
public.'0 3 This allowance is made "[i]n order to protect the Supreme Court
Building and grounds, to protect the persons and property therein, or to
maintain suitable order and decorum." 104
Given these considerations, the Supreme Court precedents may leave
one uneasy. At this juncture it may be appropriate to look at how the states
and the federal court system have incorporated this "right of access" in their
courtrooms.
V. AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE PRACTICES
A. Technological Change and the Rise, Fall, and Revival of
Experimentation
The observation may be made from the discussion that follows that
many of the more restrictive state rules are premised on Canons found in
state judicial codes of conduct.'0 5 This is no coincidence - Canon 3A(7)
carries with it a laudable pedigree. 0 6  Its predecessor, Canon 35, can be
traced directly back to the press frenzy that occurred at the Hauptmann
trial. 107
The Hauptmann trial was, ironically, a trial made for TV. Bruno
Hauptmann was charged with the kidnapping and murder of young Charles
101. United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1279 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931
(1983).
102. S. CT. BLDG. REG. 2, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/buildingregulations.pdf
(last visited Sept. 27, 2006). See also 40 U.S.C. § 6102(a) (2005).
103. S. CT. BLDG. REG. 2, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfobuildingregulations.pdf
(last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. As mentioned, Canon 3A(7) is based on Canon 35, which was adopted in 1937.
107. CHARLOTTE A. CARTER, MEDIA IN THE COURTS 4 (1981) (noting that directly prior to the
formulation and adoption of the Canon, "the Criminal Law Section at the 1935 ABA Convention
appointed a Special Committee on Publicity in Criminal Trials to conduct an in-depth study of the
abuses at the Hauptmann trial"). This study resulted in the Hallam Report. Id.
[Vol. 34: 123, 2006] First Amendment's "Right ofAccess"
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Lindbergh. 108 Charles was the 20 month-old son of Col. Charles Lindbergh,
the first man to fly solo across the Atlantic (and a world-wide celebrity for
it) and his wife, Anne Morrow Lindbergh, daughter of a prominent banker
and diplomat. 109 Because of the prominence of the Lindberghs, the trial was
a "must-see" for New York's top celebrities, who, along with the trial,
brought in spectators that filled the courtroom beyond capacity each day.110
Though there were some complications with the single camera in the
courtroom,1 1' printed press coverage seemed to be the true problem.
Commentators have since referred to this press coverage as "excessive,
frequently inflammatory, and at times, downright irresponsible." '1 12  This
sentiment applied to activities well beyond the media. Indeed, the scene as a
whole was one fit for the circus: venders waited outside the courthouse
selling their wares, and the overflow audience took to chanting "Kill
Hauptmann! Kill the German." during jury deliberations. 1 3  The Judicial
Conference watched the debacle unfold from their ivory tower, and,
rightfully dismayed, decided to take action. 114 The Conference empowered
a task force to research the effects of the media on trial proceedings. 15
After the expected results were returned showing that media coverage had an
adverse effect on trials, the Conference drafted the first formal proposal
against media access to courts. 1
16
The drafted proposal became Canon 35,'17 which prohibited cameras
and radio broadcasting of trial proceedings, declaring that such practices
"detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings."' 1 8 The Canon also
pronounced that media practices degraded the court and created
108. GOLDFARB, supra note 61, at 18.
109. COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 15; GOLDFARB, supra note 61, at 8; Lindbergh Baby
Kidnapping, http://www.celebritymorgue.com/lindbergh-baby/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
110. COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 15.
111. Id. ("One camera was discreetly placed inside a wall clock; another was mounted on the
balcony railing and tucked under a large wooden box in a humorous attempt to conceal it. The
'hidden' camera was impossible to miss. Efforts to augment the dim courtroom lighting by
installing high-intensity bulbs in overhead fixtures helped boost temperatures in the gallery to
uncomfortable levels.").
112. Id. at 16.
113. Id.
114. CARTER, supra note 107, at 4.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 4-5 (explaining that though the recommendations from the Hallam Report were not
made public, they were heavily relied on in formulating Canon 35, which was officially adopted in
1937).
118. 62 A.B.A. Rep. 1134-35 (1937).
misconceptions in the public eye. "9 Despite the Canon's advisory nature, it
was soon adopted in part or in full by a majority of the states. 20
The Canon was later modified to add television broadcasts to the list of
prohibited practices.121 This change was heavily endorsed; as noted in the
Estes discussion above, at the time of that trial only two states were actively
allowing cameras in the courtroom. 22 The practice was later reaffirmed in
1972, when the American Bar Association adopted Canon 3A(7), which
essentially restated the ban on television, audio and visual media
recording. 12
3
However, as technology continued to improve throughout the 1970s, the
adamant wide-spread opposition to cameras in the courtroom began to wane.
Attention to technological change was reflected in the early 1980s, as
commentators applauded the advances in film and electronic equipment,
emphasizing that recording devices were no longer "bulky, noisy, or
obtrusive."' 124 They were not mistaken; cameras were much more mobile,
practically soundless, and no longer required bright, flashing lights. 125 This
presented a strong case for proponents of media in courtrooms, as a
substantial part of the Estes decision rested on the physical distractions
caused by cameras. 126  Indeed, these technological advances may have
contributed to state judges reconsidering the possibility of televised court
proceedings. This is reflected in the Judicial Conference meetings of 1978,
when some semblance of a national consensus in favor of televised
proceedings was officially recognized - it was that year when the
Conference of State Chief Judges adopted a resolution encouraging states to
experiment with the use of media in judicial proceedings. 27 The resolution
eventually led to the repeal of the ABA standard and the variety of practices
we see today. 
128
119. GOLDFARB, supra note 61, at 24.
120. CARTER, supra note 107, at 6.
121. Id. ("As a result of one committee's report in 1952, the ABA's House of Delegates amended
Canon 35 by inserting a phrase banning the 'televising' of court proceedings.").
122. Id. at 7. During "the 1950s Colorado, Oklahoma, and Texas were permitting electronic
recording equipment and cameras in their courtrooms." Id. However, at the time of the Estes
decision the Court noted that "[t]he current situation in Oklahoma [was] unclear "because of
conflicting Oklahoma court decisions." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 582 (1965).
123. GOLDFARB, supra note 61, at 24.
124. CARTER, supra note 107, at 18.
125. Id. (citing Ronald F. Loewen, Cameras in the Courtroom, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 504, 510
(1978)).
126. Id. See also Estes, 381 U.S. at 536.
127. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 564 (1981); GOLDFARB, supra note 61, at 24.
128. See Letter from Robert D. Evans, Director, Governmental Affairs Office of the American Bar
Association, to the Hon. Charles E. Grassley, United States Senator in the 106th Congress (Sept. 25,
2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/congletters/106th/camerasO92500.html
[hereinafter "ABA letter"]; see also infra notes 134-240 and accompanying text.
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B. State Practice
The colonial history that anchors the United States Constitution" E9 and
that colored the Richmond Newspapers opinion has been no less influential
in state courts and practices. From the beginning, states recognized the
principle that courts should be open to the public. 3 ° In fact, many states
explicitly granted access to the courts in their founding documents. 3 ' This
history colors the contemporary practices of states, as many expanded these
principles as we became a more media-centered society.
Modernly, all states subscribe to the idea of "open courts" to at least
some degree.1 2 Most states have a constitutional or statutory provision
announcing that courts shall be public and open. 133 However, these
declarations do not come without a caveat: particularly sensitive
proceedings, such as those involving sexual abuse, abortion or divorce, for
example, may be closed to the public upon the court's discretion. 134 Caveat
aside, many states have carved out a niche for the media to operate within
the courtroom. This is evidenced through legislative enactments, 3 5 court
rules, 136 and judicial codes of conduct. 137  Other states have maintained
129. See infra notes 243-62 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 237 (2005).
131. For example, the 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey stated that "in all
publick courts of justice for tryals of causes ... inhabitants of the said Province may freely come
into, and attend the said courts," and the Pennsylvania Frame of Government of 1682 provided
"[tihat all courts shall be open ...." Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 567-68
(1980) (citation omitted).
132. See infra notes 133-40 (noting various constitutional, statutory, and local court rules
providing for some version of an "open court").
133. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 567-70.
134. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 4 (McKinney 2003) ("The sittings of every court within
this state shall be public, and every citizen may freely attend the same, except that in all proceedings
and trials in cases for divorce, seduction, abortion, rape, assault with intent to commit rape, criminal
sexual act, bastardy or filiation, the court may, in its discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who
are not directly interested therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers of the court.").
135. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 281 (expired July 1, 1997); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS § 52
(McKinney 1992); 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 29.1-29.2; see generally infra notes 135-209 and
accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., ALASKA R. OF ADMIN. 50; ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 122; Ark. Ct. Admin. Order No. 6
(2006); CAL. R. OF CT. 980; DEL. SUP. CT. R. 84; FL. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.170; HAW. R. S. CT. 5.1-2;
IDAHO CT. ADMIN. R. 45-46; IOWA CT. R. 25.2; KAN. SUP. CT. R. 1001; Mich. Sup. Ct. Admin.
Order No. 1989-1; MO. CT. R. 16; N.H. SuP. CT. R. 19; N.M. SUP. CT. GEN. R. 23-107; N.C. SUPER
CT. R. 15; UTAH CT. R. 4-401; N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 21; NEV. SUP. CT. R. pt. IV; OHIO
SUPERINTENDENCE CT. R. 12; OR. R. OF APP. P. 8.35; TENN. SUP. CT. R. 30; WIS. SUP. CT. R. 61.01-
61.12; WASH. CT. R. 16; WYO. CT. R. 804; Me. Admin. Order JB-05-15 (2005); MISS. SUP. CT. R. 3;
see generally infra notes 135-209 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., ALA. CANONS OF JUD. ETHICS, Canon 3A(7); COL. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon
3(A)(7); LA. JUD. CANON 3, available at http://www.lasc.org/press-room/policy-for-media.asp;
positions similar to that espoused by the Supreme Court,'3 8 prohibiting
electronic media in part139 and, in some cases, in whole. 140  The following
discussion summarizes a variety of methods employed by the states at the
trial court level, first describing the two typical centrist positions and then
briefly focusing on the extremes.
1. State Trial Courts
Idaho provides a ready example of media receptiveness coupled with
some aspects of restraint: state courts there are actively fostering positive
relationships with the media through a standing Courts/Media committee
established by the Idaho Supreme Court in 1998.141 Idaho courts allow
cameras and other recording devices in the courtroom, subject to the
discretion of the presiding judge. 142 Like Idaho, Missouri rules require a
media representative to obtain permission from the presiding judge before
filming, and the judge may prohibit media access if he concludes that
"coverage would materially interfere with the rights of the parties to a fair
trial."'143 These Missouri rules are lengthier than those seen in Idaho,
meticulously detailing the technical requirements for cameras and audio
equipment and setting limitations on the number of recording devices
allowed in the courtroom during proceedings.'44 Alaska, 14' Arkansas,146
Arizona,147 Colorado,148 Connecticut, 149 New Hampshire,' 5° California,''
MASS. JUD. CANON 3(A)(7); MONT. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon 35; N.J. CODE JUD.
CONDUCT, Canon 3(A)(9); PENN. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3(A)(7); see generally infra notes
135-209.
138. See Reporter's Guide, supra note 19.
139. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 63(A)(7); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACT § 218 (expired June 30, 1997); N.Y.
Civ. RIGHTS § 52; 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 29.1-29.2.
140. See D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 53(b); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 203(b).
141. Brian Kane, A Balancing Act, 48-DEC. ADVOC. 9 (2005) (describing a recently published
comprehensive guide that explains current court rules and procedures for media entities).
142. IDAHO CT. R. 45(a) (allowing cameras and other electronic recording devices only after a
request has been submitted and approved by the presiding judge; the judge may exclude any
electronic devices if the "interests of the administration ofjustice requires").
143. MO. CT. R. 16.02(b).
144. MO. CT.R. 16.04.
145. ALASKA R. OF ADMIN. 50.
146. Ark. Ct. Admin. Order No. 6 (2006).
147. ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 122 (suggesting that the judge weigh six factors in determining whether
electronic media coverage would be appropriate in the particular case).
148. COL. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3(A)(7); Hon. Mary J. Mullarkey, Media Alert (2002),
available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/exec/media/notices/cameras.doc.
149. THE COMMISSION ON OFFICIAL LEGAL PUBLICATIONS, CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK, 66-
68 (2006), available at http://www.jud.state.ct.us/Publications/PracticeBook/PBI.pdf.
150. N.H. SuP. CT. R. 19 ("With prior notice to the clerk, and the consent of the court, any person
may record and photograph, or broadcast by radio or television, the oral proceedings of the supreme
court, provided that the orderly procedures of the court are not impaired or interrupted.").
151. CAL. R. CT. 980 (allowing media coverage at the discretion of the judge).
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Hawaii, 152 Indiana,' 53 Iowa, 5 4 Kentucky,' 55 Maine, 15 6 Massachusetts," 7
Michigan,158 Minnesota,15 9 New Mexico, 160 North Dakota,
161 Ohio, 162
Oklahoma, 161 South Carolina,' i 4 Tennessee, 165 Texas, 166 Washington, 167
Wyoming 168 and West Virginia 169 all follow this approach as well.
New York takes a more restrained approach, allowing cameras only
when the New York Court of Appeals chooses to adopt an experimental
program that permits trial judges to exercise discretion in allowing cameras
into the courtroom. 170 Given that New York's regulation is prescribed by
legislative act, a whole new set of issues arises: namely, whether it is the job
of the legislature or judicial branch to decide if the courts should be open to
television media. Regardless, the New York legislature appears to have
adopted a policy of restraint and respect for its co-equal branch, condoning
court broadcasts only when they have first been authorized by the sitting
judge.171 The experimental program described in the New York statute was
adopted throughout most of the 1990s, but the courts allowed the trial
152. HAW. R. SUP. CT. 5.1-5.2.
153. Indiana Supreme Court, Guidelines for the Use of Electronic Recording Devices During
Supreme Court Oral Arguments, http://www.in.gov/judiciary/supreme/guidelines.html (last visited
Jan. 31, 2006).
154. IOWA CT. R. 25.2.
155. State Justice Institute, Reporter's Handbook on Covering Kentucky Courts 7-8 (2004),
available at http://courts.ky.gov/research/publications.htm (follow "reporters handbook" hyperlink).
156. Me. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order JB-05-15 (2005).
157. MASS. SUP. JUD. CT.R. 1:19(a).
158. Mich. S. Ct. Admin. Order No. 1989-1 (1989).
159. MINN. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3A(I 1); Procedures for Requesting Cameras in
Minnesota Courtrooms, available at http://www.courts.state.mn.us/documents/cio/Cameras-in-the
CourtroomPolicy.doc.
160. N.M. SUP. CT. GEN. R. 23-107.
161. N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 21.
162. OHIO SUPERINTENDENCE CT. R. 12.
163. Okla. Stat. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 4, Canon 3.
164. S.C. APP. CT. R. 605.
165. TENN. SUP. CT. R. 30. Though this rule is issued by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, it
applies to all courts within the state.
166. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18(c); TEX. R. APP. P. 14. Interestingly, Texas had adopted the old ABA
Canon for a time, and then returned back to its former position. Carter, supra note 107, at 7 (noting
that Texas adopted the Canon in 1974, a few years after the Supreme Court's decision in Estes v.
Texas).
167. WASH. CT. R. GEN. 16.
168. WYO. UNIFORM R. FOR DIST. CT. 804; WYo. R. CRIM. P. 53.
169. W.VA.TRiALCT.R. 8.01.
170. N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 218 (McKinney 2003). As with Idaho and Missouri, the onus in
New York is on the media representative to request permission to film or audiotape a proceeding.
171. Id.
program to expire in 1997, which reinstated the ban on cameras in trial court
rooms. 172
Like New York, Delaware has no overarching scheme controlling media
coverage, but has temporarily adopted an experimental program allowing
audio and visual coverage at the discretion of the sitting judge. 173 Louisiana
draws a distinction between trial and appellate proceedings, completely
barring visual and audio recording from appellate courtrooms, and allowing
trial proceedings to be recorded only when both parties have consented and
the judge has permitted such. 174 Louisiana guidelines impose the additional
condition that the recorded proceedings will be kept private until after the
trial and all direct appeals have been finalized or exhausted. 175  Maryland,
Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania have more moderate hybrid approaches,
allowing outside recording devices in only civil, not criminal, trial
proceedings, and allowing television coverage at the appellate level upon a
request to the judge. 17 6
Utah and D.C. courts employ the two most restrictive policies. 77 In
Utah, filming, video taping, and audio taping are all prohibited except to
preserve the record, and still photography is only allowed for ceremonial or
court approved programs. 178  The District of Columbia is the most
prohibitive of all court systems, adopting an absolute ban on the use of audio
and visual media in the courtroom, regardless of whether a proceeding is
taking place or not. '79 Limited photography is permitted under Juvenile
Court Rule 53(b)(2), but appears to apply only to areas outside the
courtroom. 0 Electronic media is strictly forbidden at the appellate level as
well. 8' Illinois, South Dakota, and Maryland follow a similar prohibitive
172. For the ten years spanning 1987-97, New York courts had such an experimental program, but
allowed the program to expire. See N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 218 (expired June 30, 1997); N.Y.
CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 52.
173. DEL. ADMIN. DIRECTIVE No. 155 (2004). It appears that the Permanent Advisory Committee
has since allowed the Directive to expire, as it was not renewed after May 16, 2005. Alabama has a
similar guideline to those seen in New York and Delaware, allowing media coverage only if the
supreme court has adopted a program allowing for such media access. ALA. CANONS JUD. ETHICS,
Canon 3A(7) (1976).
174. LA. JUD. CANON 3, available at http://www.lasc.org/press.roomi/policy-for-media.asp.
175. Id.
176. PENN. R. CRIM. P. 112; PENN. R. Cw. P. 7 (rescinded June 23, 1975); PENN. CODE JUD.
CONDUCT, Canon 3(A)(7); R.I. SUPER. CT. R, CRIM. P. 53; R.I. SUP. CT. R. art. VII; MD. R. 16-109.
For an explanation of the Maryland rule, see Cameras in the Courtroom: Rules and Guidelines for
Their Use, available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/publications/cameras-in-ctroom.pdf.
177. See generally UTAH CT. R. 4-401; D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 53(b).
178. UTAH CT. R. 4-401(l)(A)-(B).
179. D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 53(b); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CIv. PROC. 203(b).
180. D.C. SUPER. CT. JUVENILE PROC. R. 53(b).
181. D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 53(b); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. PROC. 203(b).
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structure, but allow for coverage at the appellate level and state supreme
court levels.' 
82
The default rule is exactly the opposite in Florida. There, the state
judicial rules expressly and unequivocally allow electronic media and still
photography in all judicial proceedings without a prior request to the
presiding judge.'83 Of course, the judge is granted discretion in limiting
media coverage in the interests of courtroom decorum, controlling the
proceedings, and ensuring the fair administration of justice in the case before
the court. 184 Kansas follows similar guidelines, but while Florida allows any
person to record the proceedings,185 Kansas courts allow only "news media
and educational television stations" to document the courtroom event.
186
The following states follow the general default rule espoused by Kansas and
Florida, and all of these court rules allow for the judge to later limit media
access if necessary: Georgia,187 Mississippi,18 8 Montana, 89 Nebraska,' 90
Nevada, 19' New Jersey, 192  North Carolina,' 93  Oregon, 194 Vermont,' 95
Virginia, 196 and Wisconsin. 1
97
Of course, media coverage that would interfere with jury selection,
bench conferences, or attorney client communication is expressly prohibited
in all of the states. 1'9 8 Many court rules also provide for exclusion of select
testimony based upon objections from certain classes of persons: namely,
victims, informants, undercover agents, relocated witnesses, or juveniles.' 99
182. MD. CODE CR1M. P. § 1-201; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 63(A)(7); S.D. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon
3B(13).
183. FL. R. JuD. ADMIN. 2.170.
184. Id. at 2.170(a).
185. Id. at 2.170(b).
186. KAN. Sup. CT. R. 1001. Though this rule is promulgated by the supreme court of Kansas, it
applies to all judicial proceedings within the state.
187. GA. SUP. CT. R. 75, 90. These rules are exclusive to the supreme court.
188. MISS. SUP. CT. R. FOR ELECTRONIC AND PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE OF JUD. PROCEEDINGS
3.
189. MONT. CANONS OF JuD. ETHICS, Canon 35.
190. NEB. CT. R. 17, 18.
191. NEV. SUP. CT. R. pt. IV.
192. N.J. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3(A)(9).
193. N.C. SUPERCT. R. 15.
194. OR. R. OF APP. PROC. 8.35; OR. UNIFORM TRIAL CT. R. 3.180.
195. VT. R. CRiM. P. 53; VT. R. CiV. P. 79.2, 79.3.
196. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266 (2006).
197. WIs. SUP. CT. R. 61.01-61.12.
198. See, e.g., MO. CT. OPERATING R. 16.02(d)-(e); IDAHO CT. R. OF ADMIN. 45(c)(1).
199. See, e.g., ALASKA R. OF ADMIN. 50.; Ark. Ct. Admin. Order No. 6 (2006); Miss. Sup. CT. R.
FOR ELECTRONIC AND PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE OF JUD. PROCEEDINGS 4; MO. CT. OPERATING R.
16.03(c); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266.
Finally, even though state rules may seem progressive, benches within the
state may have more restrictive rules.200
2. State Appellate Courts
It is clear that state practices at the trial level vary widely, from the
broad allowance in Florida2 1 to the complete ban in our nation's capital.20 2
The variation among the states is evidence of the ongoing debate over
cameras in the courtroom, and suggests that there is room for change as well.
In fact, this change seems to be occurring more quickly among appellate
courts within the states. The number of states that have adopted more liberal
standards at the appellate level outnumbers those that impose more
restrictive standards.0 3
Modem allowances for media coverage in appellate courtrooms often
mirror those seen in the trial rules. In fact, many of the court rules
promulgated by the supreme court of each state cover both trial and
appellate proceedings. 2 04  For those states that have exclusive appellate
rules, the guidelines tend to err on the side of admission.0 5 States adopting
the "request first, then granted" approach include Connecticut, 20 6 Georgia
appellate courts, 207 Maryland, 20 Minnesota, 20 9 South Carolina,21 ° and West
200. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT, N.D. ALA. LOCAL CT. R. 83.2 (stating that "whether or not court is
actually in session, there shall be no radio or television broadcasting or taking of photographs in or
from the courtrooms or their environs during the progress of, or in connection with, any judicial
proceeding").
201. FL. R. JUD. ADMtN. 2.170.
202. D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 53(b); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 203(b).
203. See infra notes 205-19 and accompanying text (noting the practices of numerous states with
regard to the use of media coverage in appellate courtrooms).
204. See ALA. CANONS OF JUD. ETHICS, Canon 3A(7); ALASKA R. OF ADMIN. 50; ARIZ. SUP. CT.
R. 122; Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 6 (2006); CAL. R. CT. 980; COL. CODE JUD. CONDUCT,
Canon 3(A)(7); DEL. SUP. CT. R. 84; FL. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.170; HAW. R. S. CT. 5.1-2; IDAHO CT.
ADMIN. R. 45-46; IOWA CT. R. 25.2; KAN. SUP. CT. R. 1001; LA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3(9),
available at http://www.lasc.org/press_room/policy for_media.asp; Me. Admin. Order JB-05-15
(2005); MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 1: 19(a); MASS. JUD. CANON 3(A)(7); Mich. Admin. Order No. 1989-
1; MISS. SUP. CT. R. 3; MO. CT. R. 16; MONT. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon 35; N.H. SUP.
CT. R. 19; N.J. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3(A)(9); N.M. SUP. CT. GEN. R. 23-107; NEV. SUP. CT.
R. pt. IV; N.C. SUPER CT. R. 15; N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 21; OHIO SUPERINTENDENCE CT. R. 12;
OR. R. OF APP. P. 8.35; Okla. Stat. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 4, Canon 3; PENN. R. Civ. P. 7; PENN. CODE JUD.
CONDUCT, Canon 3(A)(7); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 30; TEX. R. CIv. P. 18(C); TEX. R. App. P. 14; UTAH
CT. R. 4-401; WASH. CT. R. 16; WYO. CT. R. 804; WIS. SUP.CT. R. 61.01-61.12; STATE JUSTICE
INSTITUTE, REPORTER'S HANDBOOK ON COVERING KENTUCKY COURTS (2004), available at
http://courts.ky.gov/research/publications.htm (follow the "Reporter's Handbook" hyperlink);
Procedures for Requesting Cameras in Minnesota Courtrooms, available at http://www.courts.
state.mn.us/documents/cio/Camerasin theCourtroomPolicy.doc.
205. For example, Georgia Supreme Court rules provide that proceedings "may be broadcast by
television and radio, recorded electronically, and photographed" as long as the coverage does not
distract "from the dignity of the Court proceedings." GA. SUP. CT. R. 75.
206. THE COMMISSION ON OFFICIAL LEGAL PUBLICATIONS, supra note 149 at 66-68.
207. GA. SUP. CT. R. 75.
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Virginia." ' Interestingly, both Illinois and New York allow coverage of
only appellate proceedings, severely restricting or completely banning media
access to trial proceedings.212 Unrestrictive default rules that allow media in
unless the court determines otherwise have been approved by the Georgia
Supreme Court,213 Illinois, 214 Nebraska, 21 5 Rhode Island,
21 6 South Dakota, 2 17
and Vermont.218
C. Federal Practice
The federal court system has been much more reluctant to experiment
with electronic media inside the courtroom. This is evidenced in recent
history. Recall the discussion of Canon 3A(7) above: while the states
moved away from the strict ban endorsed by the Canon,219 federal courts
clung tightly to the principle, continually reaffirming the initial prohibition
on media access adopted in 1946.220 The policy, which was most recently
reaffirmed by the Judicial Conference in 1994 after a three year pilot
program allowing experimentation ended, bans all photography, radio, and
television broadcasting within the courtroom.
22
'
208. MD. CT.R. 16-109.
209. MINN. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3A(I 1).
210. S.C. APP. CT. R. 605(f)(1) (requiring that a written request be submitted to the presiding
judge before recording devices are allowed in the courtroom).
211. W.VA.TRIALCT.R.8.01.
212. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 63(A)(7); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACT § 281 (expired June 30, 1997); N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTS LAW § 52 (McKinney 1992); 22 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, §§ 29.1-29.2.
213. GA. SUP. CT. R. 75-90.
214. ILL. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3(A)(7).
215. NEB. SUP. CT. R. 17(c) ("Expanded media coverage of a proceeding shall be permitted in all
judicial proceedings unless the court concludes, after objection and showing of good cause, that
under the circumstances of the particular proceeding such coverage would materially interfere with
the rights of the parties to a fair trial.").
216. R.I. SuP. CT. R. art. VII.
217. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-24-6(c) (2003) ("Except as otherwise provided by these rules,
electronic recording by moving camera, still camera, and audio tape, and broadcasting will be
permitted of all judicial proceedings in the courtroom during sessions of the Supreme Court.").
218. VT. R. APP. P. 35.
219. See supra notes 134-208 and accompanying text.
220. MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & CAROL KRAFKA, ELECTRONIC MEDIA COVERAGE OF
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEEDINGS: AN EVALUATION OF THE PILOT PROGRAM IN SIX DISTRICT COURTS
AND TWO COURTS OF APPEALS 3 (1994).
221. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Office of Public Affairs, Background on Cameras
in the Federal Courts, http://www.judges.org/nccm/research/court-media-rules/adminoffice_u
_s ctscameras.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2006) [hereinafter Background on Cameras in the Federal
Courts].
The now defunct experimental program in the federal courts deserves
more than a passing mention. Even though some have suggested that the
federal courts have remained firm throughout time in their position, a
detailed look at the history of the Judicial Conference suggests that this may
not be the case.222 In fact, former Chief Justice William Rehnquist exhibited
some interest in at least investigating the possibility when he appointed the
Ad Hoc Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom in 1988.223 Shortly
thereafter, the committee's recommendation of a pilot program was adopted
by the Judicial Conference,2 4 which officially commenced in July of 1991
and allowed two circuit courts of appeals - the Second and Ninth - and six
district courts to permit cameras in the courtroom at the authorization of the
judge.225 This tightly controlled program n 6 lasted for over three years and
was considered to be a success by some.227 In fact, the official evaluation
that was produced after the program summarized the effect of the program
as follows:
Overall, attitudes of judges toward electronic media coverage of
civil proceedings were initially neutral and became more favorable
after experience under the pilot program.
Judges and attorneys who had experience with electronic media
coverage under the program generally reported observing small or
no effects of camera presence on participants in the proceedings,
courtroom decorum, or the administration of justice.
Judges, media representatives, and court staff found the guidelines
governing the program to be generally workable.2
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. See also JOHNSON & KRAFKA, supra note 220, at 4 (noting that these eight courts were
selected from a volunteer group on the basis of size, civil caseload, proximity to metropolitan areas,
and regional and circuit representation).
226. JOHNSON & KRAFKA, supra note 220, at 5 (providing specific details of the program and the
appropriate protocol to be followed by participating judges).
227. Background on Cameras in the Federal Courts, supra note 221; Cameras in the Courtroom:
Hearing on S.829 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 44-45 (2005) (statement of
Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain on Behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States Regarding
S.829 as applied to Federal Trial Courts) [hereinafter O'Scannlain statement] (stating that the
Judicial Conference proposed that cameras be allowed in appellate proceedings, but prohibited the
use of cameras in district court proceedings because "the potential intimidating effect of cameras on
some witnesses and jurors was cause for considerable concern").
228. JOHNSON & KRAFKA, supra note 220, at 7.
150
[Vol. 34: 123, 2006] First Amendment's "Right ofAccess"
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Despite this initial optimism, the Judicial Conference reviewed the data
and concluded that the intimidating effect of cameras on some witnesses and
jurors raised substantial concerns, and as a result allowed the program to
expire. 229 The Judicial Conference's rationale only partially explained why
they rejected the recommendation of the Court Administration and Case
Management Committee to allow photography, recording, and broadcasting
of civil proceedings. 2 0 By focusing on the effects on jurors and witnesses,
the Judicial Conference failed to provide any rationale supporting the
extension of the ban to appellate proceedings.
The Conference appeared to have reconsidered their absolute ban a
couple years following the expiration of the pilot program. In March of
1996, the Conference adopted a resolution that allowed for some flexibility
at the appellate level, granting each court of appeals the ability to "decide for
itself whether to permit the taking of photographs and radio and television
coverage of appellate arguments ....,,232 Despite this grant of authority, the
Judicial Conference stood fast by their original opinion with regards to trial
courts, urging the courts of appeals (at the very same meeting adopting the
resolution for appellate courts) to adopt policies that reflected the
Conference's 1994 decision to prohibit the use of photography and radio and
television coverage in U.S. district courts. 233
Under the 1996 grant of authority, two circuits - the Second and Ninth,
which notably were the two participants in the appellate program - have
allowed for media to broadcast the proceedings after approval is received
from the presiding judge.234 The other circuits do not appear to be joining
them any time soon; all eleven have adopted policies expressly prohibiting
cameras. 235
Of additional note is the current stance of the Judicial Conference's
traditional ally: the American Bar Association. The ABA, which, you may
remember, was the original drafter of Canon 35, has since changed its
tune.236 As mentioned above, the Association changed its policy in the early
1980s, and has since been an advocate for media broadcasts, particularly
229. Background on Cameras in the Federal Courts, supra note 221.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See Jim Snyder, Specter, others push for Courtroom Cameras, THE HtLL, Nov. 8, 2005,
available at http://www.hillnews.com/thehill/export/TheHillIBusiness/l 10805_cameras.html.
236. ABA letter, supra note 128.
with regards to appellate and Supreme Court proceedings.237 In 1989, the
ABA Task Force on Outreach to the Public submitted a proposal to the
ABAs policy-making body, recommending that oral arguments of the
Supreme Court be televised. 23 8 The Association also endorsed the federal
pilot program in 1991, and expressed disappointment when the pilot
program was discontinued and the ban reinstated.239 The ABA
recommended additional experimentation in 1995, and again in 2000, to no
avail. 240 In its proposals, the ABA championed the two-prong argument we
have seen from others, stating that:
Courts that conduct their business openly and under public scrutiny
protect the integrity of the federal judicial system by guaranteeing
accountability to the people they serve. Court proceedings that are
accessible and visible benefit the public because of the invaluable
civic education that results when citizens witness federal courts in
action.241
These policies factor into both sides of the arguments for and against
media coverage. A full discussion of these arguments follows, pulling from
both historical and contemporary sources to present the pros and cons of
media coverage of broadcasted proceedings.242
VI. THE FIGHT BEGINS: ARGUMENTS FOR ACCESS MEET EQUALLY STRONG
RESISTANCE
A. Trial Courts
1. Historical Background
Public trials hold a revered position in our nation's history.243 Even at
the time of our Founding, there was no question in citizens' minds that the
public jury was to play a prominent part in the nation's new government. 244
Indeed, as the new Constitution was being drafted, Alexander Hamilton
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See infra Part VI.
243. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIALOGUE ON THE AMERICAN JURY: WE THE PEOPLE IN
ACTION 1 (2005).
244. ALEXANDER HAMILTON ETAL., THE FEDERALIST 412-13 (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
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noted that there was no argument among the drafters over the value of trial
by jury,245 stating that:
[I]t would be altogether superfluous to examine to what extent [a
trial by jury] deserves to be esteemed useful or essential in a
representative republic, or how much more merit it may be entitled
to, as a defense against the oppressions of an hereditary monarch,
than as a barrier to the tyranny of popular magistrates in a popular
government. Discussions of this kind would be more curious than
beneficial, as all are satisfied of the utility of the institution, and of
its friendly aspect to liberty.246
Here Hamilton suggested that a trial by jury - which was ultimately
worded as an "open" trial in Article 111247 - provided a form of
accountability. 248 Nationalist Hamilton was not engaging in mere puffery;
his views were espoused by other prominent Founding voices. For example,
consider Thomas Jefferson, who also believed that the jury acted as an
accountability mechanism, describing trial by jury as "the only anchor ever
yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles
of its constitution.,, 249 In fact, the jury was active in securing basic rights
even before our nation's Founders incorporated it so prominently in the
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments.25 ° One instance is particularly
notable: the jury played a direct role in honoring nascent First Amendment
rights of the public and the press when acquitting publisher John Peter
Zenger in 1735 after he had been put on trial for printing articles critical of
the New York governor.2 5 '
As seen in statements by the Founders and others,252 the original
purpose of an "open court" was both to prevent wayward judicial action
behind closed doors and to "assure that the public was informed about and
could participate in the workings of the judicial system., 253 This two part
argument, promoting access for accountability and education, prevails to this
245. Id. at 443 ("The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in nothing
else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury: Or if there is any difference between
them, it consists in this; the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty, the latter represent it
as the very palladium of free government.").
246. Id.
247. U.S. CONST. art. Ill.
248. See generally HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 244.
249. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 243, at 1.
250. Id. at 3.
251. Id.
252. See, e.g., LYSANDER SPOONER, AN ESSAY ON THE TRIAL BY JURY 5 (1852) (describing a jury
as "a barrier against the tyranny and oppression of government").
253. GOLDFARB, supra note 61, at 2.
day. The argument however, has gracefully matured, as each part has had its
turn in the spotlight. At the time of the Founding, accountability was the
name of the game, and history appropriately sets the background here.
Prior to the American Revolution, the judiciary was considered the least
active branch in the colonial government, and, correspondingly, was the
least respected.254 In fact, judges at that time were more likely to side with
King George III of England than with the revolutionary leader George
Washington.255 Judges were appropriately juxtaposed against juries, as
juries provided a means - albeit incomplete - of holding judges
accountable.256 As a result, juries were highly regarded at the time the
Constitution was drafted, and both state constitutions and the federal
Constitution contained multiple guarantees of trial by jury.257  The
opportunity for ordinary citizens to govern through the mechanism of jury
service was not a favor to the citizen alone; the Framers envisioned that this
service would provide a "check" on deviant judges that may be susceptible
to financial or social status bribes. 258
The "judicial bicameralism ' 25 9 seen between a judge and a jury was
accentuated by public participation through audience attendance, and public
attendance was guaranteed for all through the public's surrogate, the
press. 260 However, the press was not foolproof, and oftentimes was unable
to fully and accurately convey court proceedings to the public without
displaying some level of partiality. 261  Judges were aware of these
limitations of the press during the first two centuries of our nation. For
example, consider the trial of Aaron Burr for the deadly duel shooting of
Alexander Hamilton. Knowing of the mass public interest in the trial, Chief
Justice John Marshall moved the trial from a small Virginia courtroom to the
Virginia House of Delegates hall to accommodate the interested viewers that
traveled from far and wide to view the trial.262 Such a move, though
unusual, recognized that "[a] trial is a public event. What transpires in the
254. AMAR, supra note 130, at 207-09.
255. Id. at 207 ("In ten of the thirteen colonies, the sitting chiefjustice or his equivalent ultimately
chose George III over George Washington.").
256. Id. at 233 ("Before 1776, colonial jurors had stood shoulder to shoulder with colonial
assemblymen to defend American self-governance against a formidable alliance of unrepresentative
imperial officers and institutions - King George, his ministry, the English Privy Council and its
Board of Trade, Parliament, colonial governors, and colonial judiciaries.").
257. Id. at 234, 236. See also U.S. CONST. art. III; U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI, VII.
258. AMAR, supra note 130, at 237 ("Unchecked by a jury, a judge might be tempted - quite
literally - to go easy on his wealthy friends .... Particularly in the case where government officials
had committed crimes against the citizenry, judges acting alone might be overly inclined to favor
fellow government officers.").
259. Id. at 238.
260. COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 41.
261. See generally supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
262. COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 39.
[Vol. 34: 123, 2006] First Amendment's "Right ofAccess "
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
court room is public property., 263 As the nation grew both numerically and
geographically, it became difficult to provide these types of
accommodations. The printed press often acted as the public's surrogate,
albeit with limitations.264 The next great step came with the advent of radio
and television recording, and moves were made to employ these new forms
of media within the courtroom.
265
One commentator aptly describes the relatively diminutive introduction
of television within the courts, noting that though there "is no reliable record
of the first appearance of a news camera in an American courtroom .... By
the 1920s, still photographs of court proceedings were relatively common in
the nation's newspapers, especially in tabloids. 266  The use of media
continued to grow, 267 and public interest grew alongside it. 268  The first
documented radio broadcast occurred in 1925,269 and by the time of the
Hauptmann trial in 1935,270 cameras were being used in the courtroom with
some regularity. 27 1  After the resulting debacle, camera use was quickly
curbed, fueled primarily by the American Bar Association's adoption of
Canon 35.272 Cameras stayed, ironically, out of the spotlight, and reemerged
only after substantial technology changes allowed for their relatively
undisturbed use.273  Their reemergence in trial and appellate courts across
the country in the past two decades has reignited debate over the
appropriateness of their use.274 The discussion that follows presents both
sides of this debate, as applied to first trial courts, and then appellate. We
begin with trial courts, as arguments from both fields tend to center around
trials.
263. Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
264. See generally COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 40-41 (discussing the importance of the press
at trials where there are seating limitations).
265. See generally ABA Letter, supra note 128.
266. COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 14.
267. GOLDFARB, supra note 61, at 23 ("During the first decades of the twentieth century, radio
and cameras captured the highlights of notorious trials ... .
268. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
269. GOLDFARB, supra note 61, at 7.
270. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
271. CARTER, supra note 107, at 2-4.
272. See generally id.
273. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
274. See infra notes 275-441 and accompanying text.
2. Proponents
a. Constitutional Considerations
As discussed above, the First Amendment and Sixth Amendment
guarantee two corollary rights with respect to trials: the First provides the
public with the right of access to attend proceedings,275 and the Sixth
provides a defendant with a fair and public trial.276 The application of these
rights has resulted in conflict at times, both between the two amendments
and within the Sixth Amendment itself.27 7  Many proponents readily
acknowledge the conflict within the language of the Sixth Amendment,
noting that the words "fair" and "public" do not always go hand in hand. 278
There is also the additional tension between the guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment and those secured by the First. 279  The weighty task of
accommodating both of these constitutional rights was acknowledged by
Justice Hugo Black when he wrote that "free speech and fair trials are two of
the most cherished policies of our civilization, and it would be a trying task
to choose between them., 280 In fact, some even go as far to admit that the
media exacerbates the natural tension between the First and Sixth
Amendments, stating that "[a]s the media become more pervasive and more
influential, the potential for conflict between the press's right to present
crime news and the defendant's right to a fair and open trial increases. 281
Others, however, argue that this conflict between the rights of the press
espoused in the First Amendment and the rights of the defendant
championed in the Sixth is merely "illusory," and that these rights can be
concurrently recognized and honored. 82 The allies falling within this
275. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577
(1980).
276. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
277. Indeed, the Sixth Amendment requires trials to be both "fair" and "public." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
278. GOLDFARB, supra note 61, at I ("The constitutional rights of people charged with crimes to
both a 'public' and a 'fair' trial may present an inherent conflict.").
279. COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 11 ("Ultimately the debate over cameras in the courtroom
boils down to a constitutional balancing act that tantalizes and torments legal scholars - the right of
public access, on one side, and a defendant's right to a fair trial, on the other."); Sentelle, supra note
31, at 25 ("All judges recognize the tension between this duty [providing the fairest possible trial to a
defendant] and the rights owed to the public in general, and news media in particular, to disseminate
information concerning such trials. In the United States, this tension is enhanced by the primacy of
the constitutional protection of freedom of the press under our First Amendment.").
280. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
281. GOLDFARB, supra note 61, at 1. See generally Charles H. Whitebread & Darrell W.
Contreras, People v. Simpson: Perspectives on the Implications for the Criminal Justice System:
Free Press v. Fair Trial: Protecting the Criminal Defendant's Rights in a Highly Publicized Trial by
Applying the Sheppard-Mu'Min Remedy, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1587 (1996).
282. GOLDFARB, supra note 61, at 1-2 (referencing a discussion between the author and respected
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particular camp tend to be scholars;21 3 however, practicing attorneys 284 and
other prominent proponents 28 5 have noted this as well. These supporters
suggest that though the interplay between the First and Sixth Amendment is
generally referred to as one of tension, the two amendments can actually be
considered to be "mutually reinforcing. 286
This idea of the "mutually reinforcing" amendments is often supported
by history. As Professor Akhil Reed Amar has noted, the jury has
historically protected the First Amendment rights of the public, just as the
First Amendment has provided protection to the defendant through public
accountability. 287 This mutual exchange - indeed, mutual reinforcement -
makes sense; the rights guaranteed by both the First and Sixth Amendments
at the time of the Founding were still relatively fragile. These rights were
strengthened as citizens exercised them in tandem. Citizen attendance in
open courts under Article III and the First Amendment provided an extra-
judicial "check" on wayward judges28  and prejudicial or biased
participants, 2s9 thereby honoring a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
fair and public trial. 290  Likewise, juries vindicated the public's First
Amendment right to free speech in finding that individuals did nothing
wrong by criticizing the government. 291 The result was a more accountable
judiciary and more vibrant and unrestricted public discussion.
Though these rights work well together when placed in this historical
context, each of these constitutional guarantees can be read on their own as
providing a fully open judicial branch. For example, take the Sixth
Amendment. Even though this amendment seems to be directed at the
accused on its face, it mentions the public as well, and arguably guarantees
law professor Erwin Chemerinsky).
283. See generally AMAR, supra note 130; LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
964 (2d ed. 1988); Chris Fitzgerald, Court TV: Are we being fed a steady diet of tabloid television,
A.B.A. J., May 1994, at 46.
284. See generally GOLDFARB, supra note 61.
285. See Strossen, supra note 30, at 648.
286. Id.
287. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1998).
288. Id. at 112 ("The ability of the public to judge the judge would tend to protect innocent
defendants from judicial corruption or oppression ....").
289. Id. at 112-13 ("So, too, the public right to monitor witnesses at trial was designed to help the
truth come out, and truth would as a rule help innocent defendants more than guilty ones.").
290. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
291. AMAR, supra note 287, at 23 ("It becomes even more clear that popular speech was the
paradigm of our First Amendment when we recall its historic connection to jury trial: popular bodies
outside regular government would protect popular speech criticizing government.").
rights that are to be shared by both defendants and the general public.2 92
Likewise with the First Amendment, where the explicit prohibition against
congressional interference of First Amendment rights can be implicitly read
to provide those same rights against the other branches of government.293
And finally, consider the text of Article III, which explicitly reminds the
reader that courts in the United States are to be "open," presumably to the
public.294
In sum, these constitutional provisions provide a strong argument for
open court proceedings, particularly when read together. 95 In fact, the
Court has used the First Amendment to state that trial courts are
presumptively open, absent some overriding interest. 296  However, even
though the Court has guaranteed the public and the press a "right of access"
to courts through the First Amendment, the right of access can be limited by
factors beyond the judge's control.297 As a result, proponents contend, to
various degrees, that the "right of access" will never be fully vested in the
people until all people are allowed access to any given proceeding.29t This,
292. AMAR, supra note 130, at 328 ("Nor did the Sixth Amendment's express statement of the
rights of 'the accused' to enjoy a public trial negate the idea that the public also had a right to attend
the trial even if the accused proved willing to waive his own entitlement. The people's independent
right to attend was strongly implicit in the Constitution's general structure of governmental
transparency, and in the wording of Article III, which spoke presumptively of open 'courts' as
distinct from closed 'chambers."').
293. Id. at 327-28 ("For instance, the mere fact that the First Amendment enumerated free-speech
and free-exercise rights against Congress did not mean that Americans lacked similar rights against
the president and federal courts, if those rights could indeed be properly inferred from the
Constitution as a whole or from the spirit of the First Amendment itself.").
294. Id. at 243 ("The explicit reminder that the court would be 'open' to the public, in keeping
with a long American tradition of open judicial proceedings, complemented Article l's transparency
guarantee - its requirement of published legislative journals - and anticipated the Sixth Amendment
promise of public trials in all federal criminal cases."); U.S. CONST. art. II.
295. See supra notes 282-91 and accompanying text.
296. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 567, 580-81 (1980).
297. See COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 40 (quoting Kelli Sager, media advocate in the O.J.
Simpson trial, as stating "[tihe fundamental precept of access is that everyone should be able to have
access to court proceedings, should be able to observe what is going on . . . . It is physically
impossible to have everyone in the courtroom... "). The fact that courtrooms are only able to hold
a limited number of people bolsters proponents' other arguments. Id.
298. Consider, for example, the right of access as applied to the O.J. Simpson trial. As one author
notes:
There were just eight seats available to the public in the small courtroom where O.J.
Simpson was tried for murder. The rest were set aside for family and friends of the
participants, members of the legal teams and representatives of the news media. "Public"
seats were at such a premium that the superior court conducted a daily lottery, with as
many as 400 persons casting lots with Deputy William Dinwiddie. He ran the drawing
with a vigilant eye for scalpers who commanded up to $200 for a courtroom seat. A
public trial? Hardly, by the historical standard of Justice Marshall. Yet the Simpson trial
was available to a public audience that dwarfed the excited crowd at the Virginia House
of Delegates [during the trial of Aaron Burr), a throng of hundreds-of-millions-
everyone within sight and hearing of a television set.
Id. at 39.
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the argument goes, cannot occur without the ability to broadcast" 9 Thus,
though the constitutional arguments explicitly deal only with a general right
of access, 300 proponents extend these arguments to imply a right of access
through media. 30' However, this extension may usher in a new set of
unforeseen issues.30 2 For the time being though, we move to arguments that
carry more force among modem proponents.
b. Practical Considerations
Beyond the constitutional arguments are the practical benefits of camera
coverage of courtroom proceedings. The practical argument is twofold:
first, the public, through their surrogate of the media, can act as an
accountability check on the judicial branch; 30 3 second, the expanded
opportunity to view judicial workings through media coverage provides a
valuable educational opportunity to all American citizens. 3°4 The first
argument was probably strongest in the first century following the enactment
of the Constitution, as skepticism of closed government and fear of
oppression still was paramount in citizen's minds.305 Though this argument
has since lost some of its initial force, it still provides a valuable function
even in today's society.30 6 This can be contrasted with the argument
involving educational value, which, though valued at the time of the
Founding, likely was considered to be a secondary benefit of open trials.
However, as the accountability function has waned, the educational benefit
has dramatically increased, particularly in today's fast-paced, media-centric
world. 307  Because of the historical underpinnings, the discussion begins
299. See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 30, at 654 ("Ultimately, all of us who are committed to the Bill
of Rights have an important stake in television access to all judicial proceedings. For our freedoms
can't survive without popular support. And they would not have popular support without public
understanding. Televised judicial proceedings have made an enormous, invaluable contribution to
that public understanding."); Marci A. Hamilton & Clemens G. Kohnen, The Jurisprudence of
Information Flow: How the Constitution Constructs The Pathways of Information, 25 CARDOZO L.
REv. 267, 296 (2003) ("In contrast to the general populace's expectation of a guarantee of public
access to the gallery of a United States courtroom, the Supreme Court has settled on a reading of the
Constitution as offering no more than some right of access to some judicial proceedings, as opposed
to a guarantee of public access to the audiences' benches in a courtroom.").
300. See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
301. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REc. 121, S10426-S10430 (2005) (statements of Sen. Arlen Specter)
[hereinafter "Statement of Specter"]; see also supra note 299 and accompanying text.
302. See infra notes 336-75 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 254-61 and accompanying text.
304. See infra notes 316-20 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 254-61 and accompanying text.
306. See infra notes 309-11 and accompanying text.
307. See infra notes 316-18 and accompanying text.
with the first argument: accountability.
The press has been seen as an "extralegal check" since as early as the
beginning of the eighteenth century. 308  This function of the press has
persisted into the modem age; in fact, some defense attorneys suggest that
continued restraint and control is needed over a select few judges even
today.30 9 These proponents argue that cameras help provide and enhance
that "check" on judicial misbehavior, stating that cameras in a courtroom
put:
[R]estraints on the judge in a way that is beneficial to the defendant.
The judge is not going to be as arbitrary (as many judges are) in
front of the camera, where he is going to have to justify his behavior
to a larger audience. A lot of these judges get away with so much
because no one pays any attention to them.31 °
Though these sweeping generalizations may not be entirely true, the
defense attorneys making these statements have first-hand knowledge of the
workings of a trial,3" and some weight should be given to these comments,
as they support the continued need for public scrutiny of the judicial system.
Accountability applies not only to judges. Indeed, the public's role in
the judicial system reaches far beyond accountability: the public also plays a
crucial part in the fair and complete administration of justice. On the
historical front, our scholarly friends remind us that one of the influential
figures in the seventeenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville, asserted "that the
core interest underlying the jury trial is that of the jurors rather than the
parties. And the citizenry's interest in a jury trial transcends that of the
twelve jurors. The public benefits from having ordinary citizens monitor
judges, the police, and prosecutors." '3 12 This argument has born true in the
modem age, as some suggest that the O.J. Simpson trial resulted not only in
a benefit to the public, but a benefit to the defendant and to the search for
308. GOLDFARB, supra note 61, at 21.
309. COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 30 (referencing Rikki J. Klieman, Court TV anchor and
former Boston criminal defense attorney, who stated that "I blessed the camera when certain judges
were kept honest rather than being arbitrary or capricious"). Rikki J. Klieman, "But a Camera in the
Courtroom Should Not Take the Blame, " CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 10, 1995, at 15.
310. COHN & DOW, supra note 28, at 30 (quoting National Jury Project trial consultant Karen Jo
Koonan).
311. Though Ms. Klieman may have a larger-than-life personality, she certainly has merit to brag
about. In 1983, just eight years out of law school, she was named one of the five most outstanding
trial attorneys in the country by Time magazine. She is of counsel to Klieman, Lyons, Schindler &
Gross while serving as a legal analyst for The Today Show and Court TV. Court TV, Biographies:
Rikki Klieman, http://www.courttv.com/anchors/rikki -klieman.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2006).
312. AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 13, at 115. The authors later note that "[tihe ultimate right of
the public to change policy and policymakers creates a strong presumption that government action in
all three branches will be open to public scrutiny. Thus a public trial, like a trial by the People
(jurors), helps preserve popular sovereignty." Id. at 117.
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truth itself.3 13  Even critics note that though televising the trial resulted in
some unique problems, it also brought forth new witnesses who were able to
question other witnesses and authenticate evidence.3 14 This holds not only
judges accountable, but also our entire justice system, keeping trials as fair
and fully informed as possible.
The second prong of the modem argument is that broadcasting court
proceedings provides a valuable educational opportunity to the public at
large.315 Modem minds are more apt to emphasize this benefit, noting that,
as a practical matter, "[m]uch of what adults learn about government - its
institutions and members, their activities, decisions, defects, strengths,
capabilities-stems from the mass media. 3 16  One scholar notes that the
benefit from observing televised court proceedings would be particularly
applicable in the legal education setting, stating that "students, educators,
and lawyers would additionally benefit by being able to observe 'firsthand,'
via the broadcast and videotape, the trial and its participants." '3 17 This
argument is further supported by the public's current perception and
understanding of the judicial branch: "[s]urveys of public perception of the
judicial process ... have revealed low levels of public understanding of the
role of courts and of judicial processes, and correspondingly low levels of
confidence in the judiciary. 318
313. See COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 27.
314. Id.
315. Christo Lassiter, TVor Not TV- That is the Question, 86 J. CRAM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 928,
959 (1996).
316. DAVID L. PALETZ & ROBERT M. ENTMAN, MEDIA POWER POLITIcs 5 (1981). See also
COHN & DOw, supra note 28, at 11 ("Surveys repeatedly indicate that more than half of all
Americans receive virtually all of their news from television.").
317. Lassiter, supra note 315, at 962. See also COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 55 ("[E]ven legal
scholars with a jaundiced view of television's public educational value rave about its effectiveness in
educating future lawyers. Professor Uelmen quickly incorporated taped segments of the Simpson
trial into the syllabi of his law school courses, as did UCLA's Peter Arenella, who decries the
televising of high profile trials while admitting it educates far more people than televising ordinary
cases. In fact, the 0. J. Simpson case is a law professor's dream. With transcripts and tapes of the
trial now well-established teaching tools in courses such as criminal procedure and evidence, the
courtroom has become a classroom.").
318. Daniel Stepniak, Technology and Public Access to Audio- Visual Coverage and Recordings of
Court Proceedings: Implications for Common Law Jurisdictions, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 791,
806 (2004). See also James Podgers, Message Bearers Wanted, A.B.A. J., April 1999, at 89 (noting
that a 1998 survey conducted by the ABA found that only 30 % "of the respondents were 'extremely
or very confident' in the U.S. justice system, while 27 [%] were no more than 'slightly confident' in
the system"). However, this indication of ignorance does not necessarily correlate with a public
interest or even desire to have trials broadcasted over the television network. In fact, in a poll taken
in 2002 after the arrest of possible 9-11 participant Zacarias Moussaui, only 42 % of the public
believed that the trial should be broadcast live, while the majority felt that the trial should not be
televised. Jennifer J. Miller, Cameras in Courtrooms: The Lens of the Public Eye on our System of
In fact, such sentiments have been around for more than fifty years.
Arguments from the bench have sounded since as early as 1956, when
Justice Otto Moore of the Colorado Supreme Court emphatically posed these
rhetorical questions:
What harm could result from portraying by photo, film, radio and
screen to the business, professional and rural leadership of a
community, as well as to the average citizen regularly employed,
the true picture of the administration of justice? Has anyone been
heard to complain that the employment of photographs, radio and
television upon the solemn occasion of the last Presidential
Inauguration or the Coronation of Elizabeth II was to satisfy an
"idle curiosity"? Do we hear complaints that the employment of
these modem devices of thought transmission in the pulpits of our
great churches destroys the dignity of the service; that they degrade
the pulpit or create misconceptions in the mind of the public? The
answers are obvious. That which is carried out with dignity will not
become undignified because more people may be permitted to see
and hear.319
Indeed, the educational value provided from televised court proceedings
works to correct public misperception about the criminal justice system as a
whole.320
Proponents are also eager to respond to criticisms voiced on the other
side of the debate. One of the main arguments advanced by critics is that of
potential prejudice affecting the jury, the witnesses, and possibly even the
judge.321 A ready response is to be found; proponents suggest that the
protective procedures in place minimize, and in some cases eliminate, the
possibility of a prejudicial outcome.3 22 The opportunities for continuance
and change of venue, the tool of voir dire, the judicial limiting instruction,
and the curative ability to declare a mistrial or reverse on appeal all
safeguard the defendant's rights while preserving those of the public and the
press. 323
Justice, S.C. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 25.
319. CARTER, supra note 107, at 8 (citing In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, 296 P.2d 465, 469 (Colo. 1956) (en banc)).
320. COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 55 ("In terms of educating the public, televising actual court
proceedings can correct inaccuracies and distortions portrayed in the fictional events of television
entertainment programs.").
321. See infra notes 346-66 and accompanying text.
322. See generally GOLDFARB, supra note 61, at 25-40 (outlining the protective procedures in
place "designed to block out ... prejudicial effects").
323. Id.
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This response is additionally supported by studies that evaluate the
impact of media on trial participants.32 4 Even critics readily admit that these
studies give credence to proponents' arguments.3 25  Proponents argue that
these studies, coupled with anecdotal accounts of cameras in courtrooms,
refute the critique that media have an adverse psychological impact on trial
326participants. 6 However, as seen below, the studies cited are not foolproof.
In fact, they are far from it. As noted by both critics and proponents,
documenting the effect of cameras on court proceedings is a difficult, if not
impossible, undertaking.327 Indeed, even with favorable results supporting
proponents, equally persuasive contentions are heard from their
counterparts, the critics.
3. Critics
For critics, the fact that trials have been routinely broadcasted for
several decades is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it presents a
longstanding accepted practice that may be difficult or impossible to
overturn. On the other, it has provided a wealth of real-life examples
demonstrating all of the risks and pitfalls of media coverage. The critics are
not few in number, and include judges, 318 scholars, 32 9 and politicians. 330 In
fact, several prominent voices in the government, including former President
Bill Clinton, joined the ranks of critics after the O.J. Simpson trial, quipping
that television coverage of the trial created a "circus atmosphere. 33'
324. See Blake D. Morant, Resolving the Dilemma of the Televised Fair Trial: Social Facilitation
and the Intuitive Effects of Television, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 329, 370-72 (2001).
325. Id.
326. See CARTER, supra note 107, at 18 ("Proponents of camera coverage have argued strongly
that these psychological effects are merely a matter of speculation for which no substantial basis
exists in the trial records."); see also GOLDFARB, supra note 61, at 96.
327. See, e.g., GOLDFARB, supra note 61, at 96 ("Few studies have tested the hypothesis that
courtroom cameras change behavior; such a hypothesis is difficult to prove or disprove.").
328. See, e.g., O'Scannlain statement, supra note 227; Cameras in the Courtroom Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Hon. Jan E. DuBois) [hereinafter Judge
DuBois Testimony].
329. See, e.g., Lassiter, supra note 315.
330. See generally John Broder, Clinton Says Televising Simpson Trial Led to 'Circus
Atmosphere,' L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 22, 1995, at A28 (discussing President Clinton's criticism of
allowing media in the courtroom during the O.J. Simpson Trial).
331. Id.
a. Constitutional Considerations
Case history works in the favor of critics on this point, as the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of a fair and public trial has been interpreted to be the
defendant's right alone, not to be shared by the public.332 The critics find
support even on First Amendment grounds, as the right of public access
declared in Richmond Newspapers has not been extended to the television
media.333 The only direct ruling by the Court on issues of media access was
in Chandler, where the Court merely held that the use of cameras was not
per se unconstitutional.334 Commentators emphasize that the Court in
Chandler made no move to require media coverage; rather, they simply held
that media coverage is constitutionally allowed. 335 Thus, critics rarely need
to set forth constitutional arguments, because the Constitution has been
interpreted in their favor thus far.
b. Practical Considerations
The crux of the critic's practical argument is that adding a camera to a
trial "significantly alters the judicial process in ways which pad and pen
never did. 3 36  Many of the critics maintain that the past decade of
widespread camera usage lends support to their argument, providing ample
examples of what can - and does - go wrong.337 Furthermore, many critics
argue that the use of cameras infuses courtrooms with politics, making
"trials more political and less judicial." '338 Finally, critics readily note that
the potential adverse effects of cameras extend beyond the courtroom,
infringing upon trial participants' privacy and safety, wrongfully
332. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 296-97 (1930).
333. See COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 43 (noting that the Constitution doesn't necessarily
require cameras in the courtroom).
334. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 573 (1981).
335. See, e.g., COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 43 ("[T]he Constitution doesn't necessarily
prohibit cameras in courtrooms, but it does not require they be allowed in either.").
336. Lassiter, supra note 315, at 933 ("The lens cap should be put back on cameras in the
courtroom."). See also COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 12 (quoting Gerald Uelmen, former Santa
Clara Law School Dean and defense attorney, who stated in one presentation: "The unprecedented
public scrutiny of [the O.J. Simpson] case has intruded to alter the roles and behavior of all the
participants in many ways, some subtle, some not so subtle").
337. See Lassiter, supra note 315, at 933 ("The wisdom of hindsight presages reconsideration of
current practices permitting cameras in the courtroom."); see also COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at
13 (quoting Gerald Uelmen, referencing the O.J. Simpson trial and suggesting that "[t]o find out
what's really happening in the next trial of the century, ... the American public may have to start
reading newspapers again").
338. Lassiter, supra note 315, at 933.
164
[Vol. 34: 123, 2006] First Amendment's "Right ofAccess"
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
encouraging civil litigants to settle, and causing a general public
misperception of the court system and a given trial.339
Critics do not deny that cameras provide an educational experience to
the general public; rather, they suggest that such benefits are outweighed by
the risks presented by media coverage.34 ° In fact, some critics even state
that judges should never be forced to balance the defendant's right to a fair
and impartial trial with the positive effects of media coverage, as a judge's
first priority is to fairly administer justice.3 4' This, critics contend, quickly
dispenses of proponents' "educational value" argument, as the mere
possibility of a judge having to compromise a defendant's constitutional
right for the incidental educational benefit to the public is too great of a
burden to place on the judicial system. 342
Furthermore, even if judges were forced to value the educational effect
of broadcasted proceedings, they should do so with caution, as the education
provided from a televised proceeding is an incomplete and imperfect one.
3 43
Critics note that the trials that which are likely to be broadcast are atypical
high-profile cases, and even those are often edited or summarized with two-
minute "wrap-ups" at the end of the day.344 This provides the public with a
distorted view of both trials in general and of the specific trial under the
spotlight. 345
Of even greater importance in the critics' argument is the potential
adverse effect media coverage of a trial can have on trial participants. As
mentioned above, proponents contend that the judicial procedures in place
provide adequate safeguards against prejudice to the defendant.346 However,
critics claim that such safeguards merely act as "legal Band-Aids,"
minimizing prejudicial decision-making to some extent, but failing to
"ameliorate media's potential disruptive influences on the trial itself. ' 347
339. See generally O'Scannlain statement, supra note 227, at 42-44 (outlining the adverse effects
of allowing cameras in the courtroom).
340. See id. ("[E]ven if [the benefit to society from media coverage] is true, increased public
education cannot be allowed to interfere with the judiciary's primary mission, which is to administer
fair and impartial justice to individual litigants in individual cases.").
341. Id. at 48.
342. Id.
343. COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 56.
344. Id.; Melissa A. Corbett, comment, Lights, Camera, Trial: Pursuit of Justice or the Emmy?,
27 SETON HALL L. REv. 1542, 1563-64 (1997).
345. COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 56. Critics note that this potential harm could be obviated
by a court-based C-SPAN, providing unbiased, "gavel-to-gavel coverage of ordinary [proceedings]."
Id.
346. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
347. See Morant, supra note 324, at 333.
Consider how media coverage affects the star of the show, the defendant.
Many critics suggest that media coverage portrays the defendant in an
inaccurate, unflattering, and incriminating light, which follows the defendant
into his personal life even after an acquittal is handed down.3 48 Furthermore,
regardless of whether the defendant is ultimately found innocent or guilty,
the camera's incriminating eye affects the public, which in turn affects
jurors, as many do not want to return an unfavorable verdict and then face
criticism from their community.3 49 As a result, impartial decision-making in
the trial jury box is further burdened, and the likelihood of the defendant
receiving a fair sentence is placed in jeopardy.350
The concerns as applied to witnesses are similarly substantial, but on
different grounds. Whereas the defendant is often an involuntary trial
participant, witnesses are regularly voluntary, and participation is fueled by
a need to see justice done.3 11 However, some argue that witnesses are less
inclined to participate in trial proceedings when cameras are present, either
because they do not wish to be thrust into the public eye or because they are
simply intimidated by the presence of cameras in the courtroom.352 This
could potentially harm a defendant's case.353 Even those witnesses who
voluntarily participate may give altered testimony, either because they have
listened to other testimony on television against a judge's orders,354 or
merely because the idea of their words being broadcast to an audience of
thousands is frightening and unnerving. 355  Broadcasted witness testimony
even follows the witness after the trial has ended - Pablo Fenjves of the
notorious O.J. Simpson murder trial noted that he had strangers approach
him in the supermarket and he had even received death threats.356 This
raises another substantial concern: the safety and privacy of trial
participants.357 Though most trial participants realize that some level of
348. CoHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 333 ("Although the Simpson defense favored televising the
trial so that people would see justice had been done and that Simpson could lead a normal life after
he was acquitted, he faced ridicule and scorn following his acquittal. Dean Uelmen calls it the
'Rodney King Syndrome,' in which the public feels 'we saw it with our own eyes and we're in just
as good a position as the jury to evaluate it."').
349. Id. at 32-34, 37.
350. Id. at 32-34.
351. Id. at 34.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 35.
354. Id. See also Corbett, supra note 344, at 1563-64.
355. CoHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 68-69.
356. Jill Smolowe, TV Cameras On Trial: The Unseemly Simpson Spectacle Provokes a Backlash
Against Televised Court Proceedings, TIME, July 24, 1995, at 38.
357. Miller, supra note 318, at 26 (noting that not only did Judge Brinkema, the district judge
presiding over the Moussaui trial, express concerns about declaring unconstitutional a rule of the
federal court system, but also for the safety of the jurors). Judge Brinkema further stated that "[a]
permanent photographic image of ... jurors [and] witnesses ... [is] out there forever in the public
domain." Id. See also O'Scannlain Statement, supra note 227, at 41.
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privacy is readily sacrificed when one is involved in a public trial, this
sacrifice becomes exponentially greater when cameras provide exposure to
the national, rather than just local, community. 358
These arguments are further supported by studies evaluating the effect
of cameras in the courtroom. Even though some critics admit that the
available studies are generally in the proponent's favor,359 others have found
differently. 360 For example, consider once again the Federal Pilot Program
of the early 1990s. 361 While many proponents have cited the evaluation
favorably, 362 others have focused on the specific results, noting the
following "disturbing" statistics: 64 % of the participating judges stated that
cameras made witnesses more anxious, 46 % thought "cameras made
witnesses less willing to appear in court," and 41 % found that cameras
distracted witnesses.363 These statistics were supplemented by serious
concerns from trial attorneys, who stressed that cameras may prevent
witnesses and parties from testifying on sensitive matters, and that damaging
accusations made at trial might persist after the trial, even if the defendant
were vindicated.364 At least one defense attorney stated that "the threat of a
televised trial would [encourage] the defendant to consider settlement
regardless of the [strength] of the case [on the merits]., 365 Critics citing
these results understandably conclude that the "disadvantages of cameras in
the courtroom far outweigh the advantages.
3 66
Other critics take a different approach: instead of looking at the study
results, they question the reliability of the limited and potentially biased
evaluations. 367 One critic suggests that potential sources of bias include both
participants and researchers, as voluntary reporting creates skewed results
and sponsorship or a researcher's personal views will color data
interpretation and analysis. 368  Another notes that there have been no
"double blind" studies conducted on the effect of cameras. 369  These
criticisms are not unsubstantiated; even the Judicial Center Report
358. Corbett, supra note 344, at 1572.
359. Judge DuBois Testimony, supra note 328.
360. See infra notes 363-71 and accompanying text.
361. See JOHNSON & KRAFKA, supra note 220 (summarizing the pilot program in federal courts).
362. See supra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
363. Judge DuBois Testimony, supra note 328.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. See Morant, supra note 324, at 373; COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 62.
368. Morant, supra note 324, at 374.
369. See COHN & DOW, supra note 28, at 12.
acknowledges the limitations of the Federal Pilot Program, noting that the
program only evaluated perceived, not actual, effects and that it culled
opinions only from judges and attorneys, not trial participants themselves.370
Furthermore, the evaluation itself recognized the potential for bias within the
program, as the pilot courts were chosen from willing volunteers, which
naturally disposed the participating judges to have more favorable views
towards electronic media coverage.37'
Finally, many critics argue that televised reporting will necessarily be
biased, as networks will rarely be able to cover a trial in its entirety.372 Even
with a network solely committed to uninterrupted coverage (much like C-
SPAN for the national legislature),373 it would be difficult to cover all trials
in full, and even if the possibility existed, snippets of proceedings would
likely be borrowed by other multi-purpose networks.374 Such selective cuts
could misconstrue statements of the participants, possibly resulting in
prejudice during trial or a distorted view of the attorneys, witnesses, or
judges that would persist even after the trial ended.375  These arguments
present no easy task for proponents; they set forth serious concerns that
should be heeded by the judicial community. Such admonitions carry over
on appeal, as seen below.
B. Appellate Courts
1. Historical Background
The background of appellate court proceedings in colonial times pales in
comparison to the rich history behind public trials and trial by jury.
37 6
Ironically, this is reflected in the sparse text of Article III of the Constitution,
which establishes the entire appellate practice at the federal level for the
United States in three concise phrases. 37 7 The paucity of language here is no
370. JOHNsON & KRAFKA, supra note 220, at 8.
371. Id.
372. CARTER, supra note 107, at 19-20.
373. See generally Marilyn Duff, C-Span Helps Viewers Bypass Liberal Spin of Major Media,
HUMAN EVENTS, Feb. 17, 1995, at 12 (describing C-SPAN as a fair and impartial technological
blessing to the national legislature, and explaining how C-SPAN helped provide the public with a
more reasoned view of Supreme Court nominees Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas).
374. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 318, at 26 (placing Justice David Souter's famous comment that
"the day you see a camera come into our courtroom, it's going to roll over my dead body" in
context, where he further explained that "camera coverage had restricted his questions from the
bench in New Hampshire because he worried about being taken out of context with a sound bite on
the evening news").
375. See generally CoHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 32-34.
376. See supra notes 243-64 and accompanying text.
377. "The Judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. I1.
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coincidence; the Framers of the Constitution indicated that the judicial
branch was considered to be the least of the three branches of the new
government.378 In fact, one Framer said as much in writing the Federalist
Papers, stating that "the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will
always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution;
because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them."37 9
Though this may seem odd in comparison to the customary view today
of the Supreme Court as the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution,"3 80 this
relegation (or should we say, delegation) to the third tier of government
power was actually a step up for appellate tribunals at the time of the
Founding.3 8' And, though history on appellate proceedings during colonial
times is relatively sparse, the "court of review" brought a more ancient
history with it when it was textually set in Article 111.382 In fact, the
appellate tradition - that of a "second opinion" - dates back over 4000 years
and is evidenced in, of all places, the Bible.3 83 The ancestor of our three-
tiered federal system we have today arose around 300 B.C., 38 4 and was
refined into a more centralized system when it finally reached colonial
hands. 385 Because the system was, by the 1780s, "tried and true" in many
ways, it may help to explain why Article III was passed in the Constitutional
Convention with little debate.386 This passage ushered in the "weakest of
the three departments of power.
'
,
387
Even though the judicial branch was considered to be the least of the
three government arms at the time of the Founding,388 it did not preclude
public interest in the functioning of the new federal court. Public interest
was present even at the first official meeting of the then-incipient Supreme
Court, and though documented public comments relate to the attire worn at
378. AMAR, supra note 130, at 207 ("Modem civics textbooks portray America's Supreme Court
as the ultimate interpreter of America's supreme law ... [t]he Constitution itself presents a more
balanced picture, listing the judicial branch third, pronouncing the justices 'supreme' over other
judges but not over other branches, and installing juries alongside judges.").
379. HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 244 ("[T]he judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the
three departments of power.").
380. Justice Brennan was the first to coin this phrase in reference to the Supreme Court, and it
seems to have stuck nicely. See AMAR, supra note 130, at 215.
381. Id. at 207-08 (noting that the "Constitution proposed by the drafters gave federal judges more
power and independence than their state counterparts commonly enjoyed").
382. See generally U.S. CONST. art. Ill; FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 17 (1980).
383. COFFIN, supra note 382, at 16-17.
384. Id. at 19.
385. Id. at 33.
386. Id. at 34.
387. HAMILTON ETAL,, supra note 244, at 412-13.
388. Id.
169
the meeting rather than the substance discussed, it was a public showing
nonetheless.389 However, it is likely that interest waned after this first
meeting, as the department was given no official seat in the new capitol and
did not decide a case until nearly three years after the first meeting.39 °
Regardless, the absence of a lengthy historical background does not
preclude one from considering history in furthering an argument on either
side. Indeed, many of the principles espoused with regards to trial courts are
easily applied to appellate courts as well, and some of unique concerns
presented by trials are lacking. 391 This is shown through the arguments of
both proponents and critics, who are not loath to delve into historical
accounts in search of support.392
2. Proponents
The general principles of accountability3 93 and education 394 remain
strong at the appellate level. These principles provide the foundation for
proponents of appellate court broadcasts, and as with those advocating for
media access at the trial level, appellate proponents buttress these two
general principles with constitutional language3 95  and practical
considerations.396  We begin with practical arguments, starting with
proponents' most powerful argument: educational value.
The strongest argument for media coverage at trial court proceedings
continues to reign supreme at the appellate level: there is incredible
educational value in broadcasting the third branch of our government,397 as it
389. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 12 (1968) ("On February
2, 1790, the Supreme Court met in its first public session in the Royal Exchange, at the foot of Broad
Street, in New York City. The justices were elegantly attired in black and red robes, 'the elegance,
gravity and neatness of which were the subject of remark and approbation with every spectator,'
though they had discarded what Jefferson termed 'the monstrous wig which makes the English
judges look like rats peeping through bunches of oakum! ').
390. Id. at 13.
391. As mentioned previously, one of the "problems" found with media coverage at the trial level,
the presence and intimidation of jurors and witnesses, is not present at the appellate level. See supra
note 353-58 and accompanying text.
392. See generally supra notes 254-61.
393. See supra notes 254-61, 308-11 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 316-20 and accompanying text.
395. Because the Constitutional arguments made and applied to trial court proceedings
presumptively apply to appellate proceedings as well, they only garner a brief mention in the
discussion that follows. This does, of course, assume that the Supreme Court precedents, which
were appropriately decided on fact-based inquiries into trials, apply equally to appellate
proceedings. For a full discussion of the constitutional arguments on both the pro and con sides of
the debate, see supra notes 275-302, 332-35 and accompanying text.
396. See infra notes 397-428 and accompanying text.
397. Of note is the fact that the other two branches have been covered by the media with some
regularity for over a decade. In fact, the House of Congress opened up their doors to full coverage in
1979, and the Senate followed in 1986. See Statement of Specter, supra note 301.
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both increases awareness and teaches laypersons about the functioning of the
judiciary. 398 The argument gains strength at the appellate level, as the cases
being decided are more likely to cover major issues of law that have possible
implications on the lives of everyday citizens.3 99
Proponents supplement this argument by looking to history, and
consider the Framers' overall intentions in constructing the Constitution. In
the early years of this nation, access to public meetings and counsels, not
only trial proceedings, was a highly protected right, and the right to free
speech and information was paramount in the Framers' minds, particularly
when it came to the citizenry being informed about their government
leaders. 400 This argument from proponents is further bolstered by the fact
that not only was the citizenry to have full knowledge about the character
and conduct of their leaders, but government itself, in all its branches, was to
be subservient to the public.4 °' Proponents then pose the rhetorical question:
given that speech (or access) is one of our immutable natural rights, and that
government's purpose is to "enlarge the exercise" of this right, to what
lengths should the government, including the court system, go to ensure and
indeed enlarge this right?40 2  Their ready answer comes in the form of
modern technology - this right can only be guaranteed for all citizens when
courts are opened through the public's surrogate, the media.4 3
398. See, e.g., Lassiter, supra note 315, at 934; Statement of Specter, supra note 301; Statement of
Chabot, supra note 12; Statement of Feingold, supra note 11.
399. Lassiter, supra note 315, at 934 ("Television coverage of a trial would be worthwhile where
major issues of law having societal significance were under discussion. And therein lies an
argument for using the television as communicator and educator."). Interestingly, Lassiter's article
generally advocates for a restriction on cameras in the courtroom - however, his focus is almost
exclusively on trial courts, suggesting that he may feel differently about cameras in appellate
courtrooms. Id. See also Statement of Specter, supra note 301 ("The current Court, like its
predecessors, hands down decisions which vitally affect the lives of all Americans.").
400. JOHN ADAMS, A DISSERTATION ON CANON AND FEUDAL LAW (1765) ("[Lliberty cannot be
preserved without a general knowledge among the people, who have a right, from the frame of their
nature, to knowledge, . . . an indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible, divine right to that most dreaded
and envied kind of knowledge, I mean, of the characters and conduct of their rulers.").
401. [G]ovemment [Q]uotes, http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/wew/quotes/govt.html
(last visited Sept. 26, 2006) (quoting James Wilson from his 1791 work Lectures on Law where he
stated: "Government, in my humble opinion, should be formed to secure and to enlarge the exercise
of the natural rights of its members; and every government, which as not this in view, as its principal
object, is not a government of the legitimate kind").
402. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 679 (1996)
("This ultimate right of the public to change policy and policymakers creates a strong presumption
that governmental action in all three branches will be open to public scrutiny.").
403. See Gregory K. McCall, Cameras in the Criminal Courtroom: A Sixth Amendment Analysis,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1546, 1559 (1985) (suggesting that particularly in cases where physical access to
the courtroom is limited, the public's right of access becomes truly viable only through the surrogate
media). See also Lassiter, supra note 315, at 961 ("[T]the importance of the public's 'attendance' at
Proponents also employ modem information and data in arguing that
appellate proceedings should be open to the public through their modem
surrogate, television media. 404 The facts used to argue for coverage of trial
proceedings are echoed here: we live in a media-centered world, and the
public will remain ignorant in the absence of media coverage of court
proceedings.45  Again, statistics are indicative: not only do the media-
related statistics apply here,4 °6 but there is the additional depressing fact that
only 43% of Americans can name just one Justice of the Supreme Court.4 0 7
Though there is no concrete data suggesting that media coverage would cure
this abysmal state of public awareness, it is argued that broadcasted
proceedings could at least move us towards the goal of a fully-informed
401citizenry.
The accountability argument follows along the same lines as the
argument set forth for broadcasted trial proceedings.40 9 As with trial courts,
this argument carries less force in modem times, and possibly is further
dampened at the appellate level (where one expects to find more
experienced, unelected judges), but nonetheless still carries some weight.4 10
Even in an established, modem court system there are a few "bad apples,"
and public and press attendance and action help to prevent those wayward
judges from misapplying the law. 411 Furthermore, access continues to help
courts in their pursuit for truth, even at the appellate level.412 In fact, the
Court in recent years has suggested that presumptive openness allows the
public and the press to provide an accountability "check" on the judicial
branch.413
Proponents not only set forth arguments for media coverage of appellate
proceedings; they also respond to criticisms raised by their esteemed
counterparts. For example, some critics contend that legislation such as that
courtroom proceedings is best served by the availability of contemporaneous, complete audio and
video accounts of the trial, which can only occur if cameras are present in the courtroom.").
404. See, e.g., CoHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 40-41.
405. See generally PALETZ & ENTMAN, supra note 315; COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 41.
406. See COHN & Dow, supra note 28, at 41.
407. Findlaw, FindLaw's US Supreme Court Awareness Survey, http://public.findlaw.com/
ussc/122005survey.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
408. See Statement of Specter, supra note 301; Statement of Chabot, supra note 12; Statement of
Feingold, supra note 11.
409. See generally supra notes 303-10 and accompanying text.
410. See Statement of Specter, supra note 301; Statement of Chabot, supra note 12; Statement of
Feingold, supra note 11.
411. See generally Statement of Specter, supra note 301; Statement of Chabot, supra note 12;
Statement of Feingold, supra note 11.
412. Statement of Specter, supra note 301; Statement of Chabot, supra note 12; Statement of
Feingold, supra note 11.
413. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) ("With respect to
judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials
and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.").
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before the respective House and Senate committees excessively interferes
with functions that are uniquely within the court's province and control.4 14
A radical yet persuasive response suggests that at least as to federal appellate
proceedings, the Constitution grants the legislature almost complete control
over the federal appellate courts.415 We need not search far for their basis of
support: Article III vests power to only one court, a supreme court, and then
"in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."'4 16 Congressional control at the Supreme Court level is certainly
not lacking; Article III, Section 2 reminds us that Congress has discretion to
regulate the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.4 17
Though this argument certainly has substance, it also has serious
negative political ramifications. For some, it brings to mind separation of
powers concerns; for others, outright conflict seems imminent. 418  For
example, Stephen Wermiel of American University hypothesized that if the
legislature forcibly imposed such regulations on the courts, "it would be a
sign of streaming the relations between the two branches to a new level of
stress. 419
Of course, there are those that we may term "limited proponents,"
advocating for coverage of appellate proceedings but imposing more
stringent conditions on trial coverage. Among these is prominent scholar
Alan Dershowitz, who has been a longtime proponent of media coverage,
but has become recently disillusioned by the approach of Court TV,
suggesting that "with its emphasis on sensational, audience-grabbing cases
[Court TV] seems to have destroyed any realistic likelihood that our judicial
branch will be televised with dignity. '420 Dershowitz raises a strong point:
414. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Can Congress Force Television Cameras on the Supreme Court?,
Nov. 10, 2005, http://althouse.blogspot.com/2005/l l/can-congress-force-television-camerashtml ("I
would very much like to see the oral arguments [of the Supreme Court] on television, but I don't
think Congress ought to be imposing it on the Court .... I should think there is a decent argument
that this would be unconstitutional, violating separation of powers.").
415. See generally AmAR, supra note 130, at 214; Statement of Specter, supra note 301.
416. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
417. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.").
418. See, e.g., Althouse, supra note 414; Tony Mauro, Congress Moves Closer to Allowing
Cameras in Federal Courts, Nov. 11, 2005, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=
16052 ("[T]he climate has changed to the point where it is possible to imagine, sometime in the next
few years, Supreme Court oral arguments on the air, [or] on cable ....").
419. Melissa Drosjack, Pols Consider Cameras at Supreme Court, Fox News, Nov. 10, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,175239,00.html. Constitutional arguments aside, Wermiel
suggests that practicalities and present judicial views on the issue should play a role in congressional
action. Id.
420. Fitzgerald, supra note 283, at 46 (quoting Alan Dershowitz, who responded to a question
though the general public may think of Court TV when they think of
televised judicial proceedings, the real hope of proponents is that broadcasts
would follow more along the lines of C-SPAN,4 2' covering judicial
proceedings around the clock without editorializing and bothersome
commercial breaks.422
Dershowitz is not the only "limited-proponent" - many others at least
acknowledge the differences between trial and appellate proceedings, and
generally suggest that if cameras belong anywhere, it is at the appellate level
rather than at the trial level.423 Many of the unique concerns that permeate
trial court proceedings are conspicuously absent at the appellate level.424
Consider, for example, the intimidation of witnesses. Appellate proceedings
are based wholly on an unemotional record and two (generally highly-
qualified) lawyers arguing in front of a judge or panel of judges.425
Witnesses play no part in these proceedings. 426 Thus, the argument goes, the
suggestion that cameras will intimidate witnesses just does not hold water at
the appellate level.427 This argument is equally applied to concerns over
juror intimidation and prejudice, as the judge replaces the jury as the
ultimate decision maker at the appellate level.428 This difference had been
noted by Justice Stephen Breyer, who indicated in a recent talk that many of
the concerns over broadcasted proceedings at the trial level disappear when
the conversation changes to coverage of appellate proceedings. 429
Of final note is the absence of constitutional arguments seen in the
discussion. Generally speaking, the arguments at the appellate level fall
along the same lines as those seen at the trial level. 430 Therefore, it can be
said, as with trial proceedings, there are strong constitutional arguments to
be made at the appellate level as well. 431 However, dicta from the Supreme
posed by Fitzgerald by stating that the ideal court coverage "would be a noncommercial operation,
not driven by ratings, available as a public service to the citizens interested in seeing how an
important branch of our government functions").
421. See generally Duff, supra note 373.
422. Id.
423. One of Dershowitz's allies deserves mention: Justice Stephen Breyer has generally been
receptive to the idea of broadcasted court proceedings, but has stated that, particularly in considering
the O.J. Simpson trial, "I think I'm not certain I would vote in favor of having them in every
criminal trial in the country." Drosjack, supra note 419.
424. Id.
425. Cameras in the Courtroom Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005)
(statement Court TV Chairman and CEO Henry Schleiff) [hereinafter Schleiff Testimony].
426. Id. ("I would submit, that where no witnesses or other parties are involved, just lawyers
arguing to other lawyers - albeit lawyers dressed in robes .... ).
427. Al Tompkins, A Case for Cameras in the Courtroom, TV/RADIO, Nov. 28, 2000, available at
http://www.poynter.org/content/content-view.asp?id=5132&sid=8.
428. See generally Drosjack, supra note 419; Schleiff Testimony, supra note 425.
429. Gina Holland, Supreme Court Justices Conflicted On Benefits of Courtroom Cameras,
ASSOCIATED PREss, Nov. 10, 2005.
430. See supra note 395 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 303-10 and accompanying text (many proponents naturally extend these
[Vol. 34: 123, 2006] First Amendment's "Right ofAccess"
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Court might indicate otherwise,432 the precedent on the books of the
Supreme Court generally favors the critics. With that said, it seems only
appropriate to continue with our equally formidable contenders - the critics.
3. Critics
Though it may seem difficult to respond to contentions that cameras in
the courtroom at the appellate level are perfectly appropriate, critics of the
practice enter the ring with a litany of arguments in support of keeping
television away from the revered bench. These arguments ultimately refute
the suggestion that the judicial branch remains a "mystery" to the general
public and endorse traditional methods of learning about government service
and operation - in person attendance.433
Though appellate proceedings do not present many of the unique
concerns seen with cameras at the trial level, critics contend that camera
coverage of appellate and Supreme Court oral arguments would nonetheless
alter the dynamics of oral argument.434 Indeed, the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist and others have argued that the invasive presence of cameras
would create a "chilling effect" on both the judges and the attorneys, as
attorneys will be restricted from arguing passionately for their client and
judges will feel restrained from asking pointed questions for fear of public
misperception of their stance on a particular issue. 435 However, the potential
arguments to appellate proceedings).
432. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (stating that the First Amendment "has a structural role to play in securing and fostering
our republican system of self-government. Implicit in this structural role is not only 'the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,' but also that the
antecedent assumption that valuable public debate - as well as other civic behavior - must be
informed") (citations omitted); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)
("[T]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals
to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public
may draw."); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (stating that the First Amendment
proclaims the right to "receive information and ideas"); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843, 862-63 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[P]ublic debate must not only be unfettered; it must also be
informed."); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (stating that "[a] trial is a public event. What
transpires in the courtroom is public property .... Those who see and hear what transpired can
report it with impunity"); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) ("[T]he First Amendment
does not speak equivocally ... [i]t must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit
language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.").
433. References to the "mysterious" judicial branch can be found in many proponents' sources.
See, e.g., Tompkins, supra note 427; Drosjack, supra note 419.
434. See Charlie Rose Interview with Chief Justice William Rehnquist (PBS television broadcast
Feb. 16, 2001).
435. Id. See also Stepniak, supra note 318, at 808-09 ("It is difficult to appreciate why an avenue,
which would permit the public to observe the submissions and oral arguments in their highest court,
for public misperception runs deeper than just individual views of the
justices. Justice Stephen Breyer has suggested that televised broadcasts of
Supreme Court proceedings "would give the public a distorted picture of
how the [ Court functions" because the oral proceedings comprise a very
small percentage of the decision-making process.436 Though proponents
argue that this misperception is equally present when spectators attend
proceedings in person and alternative media could be used to supplement the
oral record,437 the fact remains that television poses a serious potential in
misconstruing the operations of the Court.
Another substantial critic argument promulgated at the appellate level is
that cameras would infringe upon the traditional role of the judge as an
anonymous, unbiased arbiter. 438  Former Chief Justice Rehnquist appeared
to espouse this view when he expressed concern over the potential loss of
"mystique and moral authority" that the Court currently holds. 439  The
former Chief indicated that camera exposure might jeopardize this favorable
aura within and around the Court.44° While some dismiss these concerns as
mere "personal preferences," 44' they arguably reach beyond the quirky
choice of an individual and implicate the Founder's views of what the Court
should be. The potential for irreparable damage to the courts deserves
strong consideration in this discussion, and who better to look to than the
current judiciary in weighing this factor?
should remain closed because it is feared that the public may not appreciate that questions asked by
judges may not actually reflect their own views, or that it may cause judges to be more careful in the
questions that they do ask."); Miller, supra note 318, at 26 (placing Justice David Souter's famous
comment ("the day you see a camera come into our courtroom, it's going to roll over my dead
body") in context, where he further explained that "camera coverage had restricted his questions
from the bench in New Hampshire because he worried about being taken out of context with a sound
bite on the evening news").
436. Michal C. Dorf, A TV Appearance by Two Supreme Court Justices Indicates How Much the
Court Continues to Value Image Control, July 9, 2003, available at http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/dorf/
20030709.html.
437. Stepniak, supra note 318, at 809-10 (noting that O'Connor's argument "implicitly concedes
that members of the public observing proceedings from the public gallery are equally misled" and
suggesting that this situation "should be seen as an opportunity for technology to remedy the lack of
openness. Audio-visual transmission of oral argument supplemented by electronic access to written
submissions . . . would arguably permit members of the public to acquire an understanding of
cases").
438. See Stepniak, supra note 318, at 805 ("U.S. federal judges, and especially Supreme Court
Justices, appear to base their objections to camera coverage of appeal cases on the grounds that such
coverage would ... take away their independence and anonymity, and turn their deliberations into
subjects for street talk.").
439. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
440. See id. Other Justices of the Supreme Court have also expressed this concern. For example,
in 1995 Justice Anthony Kennedy remarked that he was "delighted [to be] less famous than Judge
Ito." Id.
441. Id. ("Such rationales, though understandable as personal preferences, appear to dismiss the
electronic media's potential to enhance public access and understanding, and suggest a preference
for limited publicity of judicial proceedings in forms that are unintelligible or inaccessible to the
public at large.").
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VII. CURRENT VIEWS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF CHANGE
Indeed, arguments promulgated on both sides of the debate seem
substantial, and it would indeed be a difficult task to choose between the two
sides."' Thankfully, that is likely not our job. Rather, it is left to the able
minds of state legislatures, judges, the federal judiciary, and ultimately, the
Supreme Court. Because these are the people most likely to endorse and
enact change, we consider their views first, and then follow with current
viewpoints within the legislature and the academy.
A. Views Among the States and Federal Judiciary
The Judicial Conference is the most appropriate body to look to when
searching for general views from the federal judiciary, as they are the federal
courts' policy-making body. 443 The Conference has been active in this area
since the inception of media in the courts.4 " Given the Conference's regular
interest and participation in this subject, 445 one might expect a more
tempered view than that espoused in the original Judicial Canon 35. Such an
expectation, however, would be merely that: the Conference continues to
stand in adamant opposition to even limited electronic media coverage in
trial courts. 446 However, as noted earlier, the Conference has backed off on
its stance at least as to appellate courts, noting that, "since 1994[,] the
Judicial Conference has permitted 'the photographing, recording, or
broadcasting of appellate arguments' in the Circuit Courts of Appeals."" 7
442. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941) ("Free speech and fair trials are two of
the most cherished policies of our civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose between
them.").
443. See generally O'Scannlain statement, supra note 227.
444. Id. (noting that the Judicial Conference has "examined the issue of whether cameras should
be permitted in the federal courts for more than six decades").
445. Id.
446. Id. ("The Judicial Conference strongly opposes S. 829, a bill that would 'allow media
coverage of court proceedings,' so far as it applies to the federal trial courts .... The Judicial
Conference in its role as the policy-making body for the federal judiciary has consistently expressed
the view that camera coverage can do irreparable harm to a citizen's right to a fair and impartial
trial."). Judge O'Scannlain's concerns echoed those voiced in September 2000 by Chief Judge
Edward E. Becker of the Third Circuit, where Judge Becker provided a statement on a bill similar to
S. 829 on behalf of himself and the Juducial Conference. See generally Judicial Conference Nixes
Cameras in Courtrooms, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 429 (2000).
447. Id.
B. Views of the Supreme Court
The traditionally vehement opposition to cameras within the Supreme
Court has lessened in recent years, and has been seriously dampened by the
events of this past term. Sitting chief justices have generally set forth the
strongest opposition,448 but the arrival of the new Chief has proponents
hopeful.449
As previously noted, the late Chief Justice Rehnquist was a long-time
opponent to broadcasted proceedings. 4 0 Even the late Chief Justice Burger,
author of the Richmond Newspapers opinion, was opposed to the use of
electronic media to record court proceedings. 41  The Justice argued that
television coverage would necessarily result in selective and distorted
coverage because editorial treatment would pull "snippets" of proceedings,
providing the general public with a "distorted conception" of the Court and
the given case, which would "be 'bad for the country, bad for the court and
bad for the administration of justice. ''452 Justice Powell also expressed
similar concerns about selective coverage.4 53
Concerns have not been limited to editorializing. In the past, "[s]ome
judges even dropped broad hints that such a law might be an
unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers. 454 More recently,
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor expressed their concerns about televised
proceedings, where Justice Kennedy stated that "[a] number of people would
want to make us part of the national entertainment network,, 455 and
O'Connor, in her usual cautious demeanor, opined that there is not "a total
consensus as [of] yet on having cameras in all courts. 456
Beyond the articulated concerns exists just downright opposition. For
example, in 1996, Justice Souter told a congressional panel that "[t]he day
you see a camera come into our courtroom, it's going to roll over my dead
body.9 457 Justice Souter is joined in part by his colleague, Justice Antonin
448. See supra notes 439-40 and accompanying text.
449. See, e.g., Mauro, supra note 418.
450. See supra notes 439-40 and accompanying text.
451. Eleanor Randolph & Al Kamen, Chief Justice Considers Televising the Supreme Court;
Burger Opposes Selective Coverage of Proceedings, WASH. POST., Apr. 12, 1986, at A5.
452. Id.
453. See Jay Sharbutt, Jurist Favors TVin Court for Law Schools, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1989, § 6,
at 8 ("Like retired chief Justice Warren Burger, [Justice Lewis Powell, Jr. is] against TV coverage of
the Supreme Court for general broadcast.").
454. Mauro, supra note 418.
455. Holland, supra note 429.
456. Id.
457. Id.
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Scalia, who has flatly said that there is "not a chance" cameras would enter
the halls of the Court.458
However, Justice Souter's staunch opposition is not shared by all of his
colleagues. In fact, some Justices have not hesitated in endorsing the idea of
broadcasted proceedings. At least three former Justices have openly
endorsed the possibility of cameras in the courtroom. Justice Brennan, the
author of the compelling concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, once
commented: "I feel strongly that we should allow television and radio
broadcasts of our proceedings. '45 9 He believed that this would "eliminat[e]
the mystique surrounding the Court" and "creat[e] 'a better understanding of
the court's functioning and the way the court operates.' ' 460 Justice Felix
Frankfurter has wholeheartedly endorsed the idea of cameras in the
courtroom, stating that "he longed for the day when the news media would
cover the Supreme Court as thoroughly as it did the World Series" because
he believed that "the public confidence in the judiciary hinges on the
public's perception of it, and that perception necessarily hinges on the
media's portrayal of the legal system.",461  Justice Marshall, like his
esteemed colleagues, has also gone on the record in support of broadcasted
proceedings. 462
Several current Court members side with Justices Brennan, Frankfurter,
and Marshall. Justice Stevens, the most senior member on the Court, has
stated that televised proceedings are at least "worth a try., 463 And even
those Justices who have articulated some concerns have also noted that
cameras could help lawyers who might argue someday before the Court, and
that it is easier to make arguments for cameras than against them. 4  The
changing composition of the Court suggests that Justice Stevens and Justice
Kennedy will have some new allies in this area: Chief Justice Roberts has
already indicated a willingness to at least consider the option of televised
proceedings, and newbee Justice Alito encouraged the use of cameras in the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 465 These Justices receive much support
458. Drosjack, supra note 419.
459. Piccus, supra note 24, at 1095 (internal quotation marks omitted).
460. Id.
461. Lassiter, supra note 315, at 963.
462. Cameras in the Supreme Court: A dry-run for the justices, BROADCASTING, Nov. 28, 1988,
at 57, 58.
463. Henry Weinstein, Televised High Court Hearings Backed: Public Understanding Would Be
Enhanced, Stevens Believes, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 1989, at 3.
464. Holland, supra note 429.
465. Roberts Hearings, supra note 3 (mentioning that the Framers "appreciated the benefits that
would come from public awareness. This is a very important principle"); Alito Hearings, supra note
3 (responding to a question by Senator Arlen Specter, who asked why the Supreme Court shouldn't
from other federal and state judges. In fact, this latter bloc of the judiciary
seems much more open to the idea, with many noting that we should expect
to see cameras regularly in the courts "in our lifetime.,
466
C. The Spoken Views of the National Legislature
Proponents of televised court proceedings are even more readily found
in the legislature and in academia, where members of Congress speak openly
on behalf of their constituents and the public, and scholars advocate
televised courts under constitutional theory. 467 The most vocal legislative
voices sound from the authors of the current bills up for consideration, as
bill sponsors regularly provide either oral or written testimony in support of
the bill. 468  For example, take Senator Arlen Specter, who sponsors Senate
bill 1768 along with Senators Leahy, Coryn, Allen, Grassley, Schumer, and
Feingold.469  Senator Specter is an unabashed proponent of televised
appellate court proceedings, and has argued with particular force for live
Supreme Court broadcasts over the years.470 Senator Specter's arguments
for the current bill echo those of other proponents - Specter essentially
argues that televised court proceedings will better educate the public on the
workings of the Supreme Court47' and will keep Supreme Court Justices
be open to the public with television, Alito stated: "Well, I had the opportunity to deal with this
issue, actually, in relation to my own court a number of years ago. All the courts of appeals were
given the authority to allow their oral arguments to be televised if they wanted. And we had a debate
within our court about whether we should allow television cameras in our courtroom. And I argued
that we should do it. I thought that it would be useful." (at this point, Judge Alito was interrupted by
Senator Specter)). Though then - Judge Alito was not able to come out and say yea or nay on
televised Supreme Court proceedings, he suggested that he would remain open to the idea. Id.
(stating that "[t]he issue is a little bit different on the Supreme Court. And it would be presumptuous
for me to talk about it right now, particularly since, I think, at least one of the justices has said that a
television camera would make its way into the Supreme Court room over his dead body. So I
wouldn't want to comment on it ... [regardless,] I will keep an open mind, despite the position I
took on the 3rd Circuit").
466. See Miller, supra note 318, at 27 (quoting South Carolina District Court Chief Judge Joseph
Anderson, Jr., who stated "'I think we will see televised federal proceedings in our lifetime. Federal
judges should be given discretion to allow or disallow cameras in the courtroom for cases of local
interest. However, I agree that the Moussaui trial is one case where it should definitely be
disallowed"').
467. See, e.g., Kaitlin Thaney, Senator pushes for cameras in high court, http://www.rcfp.org/
news/mag/29-4/bct-senatorp.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2006) (noting that Senator Arlen Specter
introduced a bill that, if passed, would permit U.S. Supreme Court proceedings to be televised).
468. See id.; supra note 301 and accompanying text.
469. See S. 1768, 109th Cong. (2005).
470. See Statements of Specter, supra note 301 (noting that, in arguing a similar bill in September
2000, he said "I do believe the day will come when the Supreme Court of the United States will be
televised. That day will come, and it will be decisively in the public interest so the public will know
the magnitude of what the Court is deciding and its role in our democratic process").
471. Id. ("Televised court proceedings better enable the public to understand the role of the
Supreme Court and its impact on the key decisions of the day.").
180
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accountable to the public and to their co-equal branches.472 This is the same
two-prong argument seen in the discussion above.473 Not only does Senator
Specter employ the double-punch approach of education and accountability,
but he also supports his practical arguments with a constitutional basis for
televised proceedings, noting that "[b]eyond this general policy preference
for openness, however, there is a strong argument that the Constitution
requires that television cameras be permitted in the Supreme Court.,
47 4
Finally, the Senator concludes by providing empirical data supporting his
contention; indeed, the same data seen used by proponents.475
As seen by the numerous co-sponsors, it is clear Senator Specter is not
alone. 476 In fact, Senator Grassley has authored similar bills in the past,
477
and Senator Feingold has lodged his support with similar proposals for
several years running.418 Like Senator Specter, Senator Feingold also
contributed a statement on the pending Senate proposals, citing educational
value47 9 and accountability480 as two reasons to support the proposal, and
also making a general policy argument in support as well. 481  The Senator
also noted that there are some complicated issues at the trial level involving
media coverage, but suggests that there are safeguards available to make
broadcasting viable there too. 482 Indeed, the states themselves employ many
of these protectionary measures.483  Trial proceedings aside, Senator
472. Id. (stating that the Supreme Court decision in the well-known case of Bush v. Gore "cried
out for greater public scrutiny of the process by which the Justices heard arguments and all but
decided the fate of the 2000 presidential race").
473. See supra notes 393-94 and accompanying text; see also Statement of Specter, supra note
301 (casting his own argument into two prongs, Specter states that "televising the proceedings of the
Supreme Court will allow sunlight to shine brightly on these proceedings and ensure greater public
awareness and scrutiny").
474. Statement of Specter, supra note 301 (referencing Richmond Newspapers and Chandler).
475. Id. (referencing the Federal Pilot Program Evaluation).
476. Id.
477. Statement of Chabot, supra note 12.
478. Statement of Feingold, supra note 11.
479. Id. ("Through televised court proceedings, the American people can learn so much more
about the operation of our judicial system.").
480. Id. ("Cameras in the courtroom will also increase transparency in government. When the
workings of government are transparent, the governed can understand them more thoroughly and
constructively, and more readily hold their elected leaders and other public officials accountable.").
481. Senator Feingold makes the very practical argument that almost every major event in recent
history has been available through television broadcasts. Id. Thus, he sees no reason why court
proceedings, particularly those at the Supreme Court, should not be available as well. Id. ("For
decades, Americans have been able to watch virtually every significant event of national importance
on television, except for proceedings of the judicial branch.").
482. Id.
483. Id.
Feingold concludes by stating that "[t]here is no good argument, in my view,
for keeping cameras out of appellate proceedings.',
484
The Senators have allies in the House of Representatives.
Representative Steve Chabot authored the Sunshine in the Courtroom Act,
which, instead of addressing only Supreme Court proceedings as seen in
Senator Specter's bill, applies to all federal trials and appeals. 485 The
congressman uses similar arguments to make his point,48 6 and like Senator
Specter,487 compares the judicial branch to the floor of the Senate and the
House, noting that those branches have been open for a full decade.488
Though these proclamations may give the perception that members of
Congress are all for opening the courts to media coverage, they tend to give
a skewed view of the real stance of Congress. A more accurate outlook can
be culled by looking at the voting record on past bills of a similar nature.489
As may be gathered, none of these proposals were ever enacted, and few
even made it to the full floor of either house.490 This suggests that Congress
remains split on the issue, and though broadcasted proceedings may have
some vocal proponents,49' there are likely a fair number of reluctant
Congress members who think otherwise.
D. Current Views in Academia
It is not nearly as difficult to see the split among academics as it is
within the national legislature. This may be merely because of the nature of
the institution - professors do not have a throng of constituents to answer to,
and they are more likely to be limited by their field of expertise than
anything else. We have seen glimpses of this split in the discussion above,
484. Id.
485. Statement of Chabot, supra note 12.
486. H.R. REP. No. 109-271, at 112 (2005) ("It is good public policy for Congress to facilitate,
through media access to the courtroom. The ability of people to exercise their right to freedom of
speech, freedom of the press, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances").
487. Statement of Specter, supra note 301.
488. H.R. REP. No. 109-271, at 113 (2005) ("The chambers of Congress are open to all citizens
through CSPAN ... allowing the American people to stay apprised of the actions of the Legislative
Branch of Government. Why should the Judicial Branch be any different?").
489. See, e.g., AALEGIS.ASC, Congress Focuses on Judicial Activism and Related Legislation,
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/may97ttb/legis.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2006) (noting that H.R. 702,
which was introduced in 1997, contained similar provisions to a bill introduced the year before in the
104th Congress, which passed the House but failed in the Senate); S. 3086, 104th Cong. (2000)
(suggesting that the bill made some initial moves, but then languished in the Senate Judiciary
Committee); H.R. 594, 104th Cong. (1995); Kevin Goldberg, 2003 FOI update: Congress, Mar. 17,
2003, available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=6510 (noting that
Congress "once again failed to move any of the numerous proposals related to cameras in the
courtroom").
490. See supra note 489 and accompanying text.
491. See supra notes 278-327 and accompanying text.
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as law professors write - and fall - on both sides of the debate.492 We see
this even more so with the discussion on broadcasting trials, as some
academics that would side with appellate proponents take a more cautious
approach to media access at trial proceedings. 493 Even though it appears that
there are a higher number of academics in favor of media access, 494 it is
difficult to get a precise statistic, as there are likely many soft-spoken critics
that would argue differently.
VIII.BRIEF THOUGHTS: A MODEST OPINION AND HYPOTHESIS
Justice Hugo Black's words of caution ring true; 495 weighing the two
sides of the debate is indeed a weighty task, and one I am not fully equipped
to manage. However, a few thoughts may be in order. It appears that there
are several additional factors to consider when deciding that cameras should
be allowed in a trial, rather than an appellate, proceeding. Because of this, it
seems most appropriate to give a trial judge broad discretion in regulating
broadcasts at the trial level. Additionally, to protect participants' privacy
interests, it would be only right to require consent of the participants before
filming is allowed. Employing these safeguards would resolve many of the
concerns voiced by critics, and it would still allow for broadcasts in many
situations, at least fulfilling the educational potential that court broadcasts
demonstrate.
On the other hand, there are far fewer critiques of appellate proceedings,
and the current Senate bill appears to have the most viable approach for this
segment of court proceedings. Senate Bill S. 1768 would presumptively
allow broadcasts of all Supreme Court proceedings (of course, this could be
realistically and easily extended to all appellate proceedings).496  Cameras
would be excluded by a majority vote of the presiding judges,497 thus taking
into account cases or substantive material of a particularly sensitive nature.
This would further promote the educational aspect of televising court
proceedings, and it would more so employ the accountability check on
492. See generally Lassiter, supra note 315 (arguing that televised court proceedings would be
beneficial in the legal education setting); Fitzgerald, supra note 283; AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note
13.
493. See, e.g., Lassiter, supra note 315.
494. This arguably could be seen in part through the well-known scholar names that appear on the
proponent's side: Akhil Reed Amar, Alan Hirsch, Erwin Chemerinsky, and Alan Dershowitz, to
name a few.
495. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
496. S. 1768, 109th Cong. (2005).
497. Id.
183
presiding judges, as they would be given less discretion in deciding to bar
cameras from the courtroom.
A final note of caution: though the constitutional arguments are
powerful, the Court has shown no inclination in adopting them, 498 and
imposing such regulations on the Court would likely cause unnecessary
discord among the government branches. Thus, proponents will do best
using practical arguments to further their cause.
IX. CONCLUSION
Given the recent personnel changes on the Court and the resurgence of
interest by the legislature, it is certainly reasonable to expect cameras to take
a more prominent place in the court system as the next decade unfolds. This
is predicted by some commentators and delighted in by proponents. For
now, we can only wait and see if the bills in Congress stay active, and if the
new justices are able to influence their colleagues in accepting technological
access within the United States court system.
Audrey Maness
498. See supra notes 332-35 and accompanying text.
